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ABSTRACT 
 
Rapid and accurate detection and diagnosis of infectious agents is crucial in prepared-
ness for diseases and biothreats. Due to a lack of rapid diagnostic capabilities, diseases 
and outbreaks may remain undetected. Currently available point-of-care tests often lack 
the sensitivity to directly detect pathogens in samples, thus there is a need for quick and 
robust solutions for identification of pathogens in order to mount appropriate respons-
es. The spread of infectious diseases is a global challenge and outbreaks and epidemics 
place great strains to healthcare and economy. Several of the pathogens causing these 
diseases are not only major public health issues but pose also potential biothreats. This 
thesis describes the performance of field-capable gene amplification methods in the 
detection of three bacterial pathogens (Francisella tularensis, Bacillus anthracis, and Yersinia 
pestis) and a viral pathogen causing respiratory infections (influenza A virus). The meth-
ods include on-site nucleic-acid extraction and rapid real-time PCR amplification of 
selected gene regions in these pathogens occurring in animal tissue and human naso-
pharyngeal samples. Results confirm that currently-available portable thermocyclers can 
generate highly accurate diagnostic results in field. Furthermore, genetic characteriza-
tion of a common respiratory pathogen, adenovirus is presented by investigating ade-
noviruses circulating in Finnish garrisons with molecular sequence analysis. Genetic 
characterization of a pathogen is also an important tool in investigations of alleged use 
of biological weapons. The presented methodology and workflow serves as an effective 
tool for decision makers in biothreat preparedness and in case of deliberate spread of 
pathogens. 
 
  
 iv
TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Biologisella uhalla tarkoitetaan mikrobin tai muun biologisen materiaalin, kuten toksii-
nin aiheuttamaa joukkosairastumista tai sen vaaraa, silloin kun tauti ei tartuntavaaransa 
vuoksi ole hoidettavissa normaalitoimin. Maailmanlaajuisiin biologisiin uhkiin on va-
rauduttava riippumatta siitä, ovatko ne luonnollisia epidemioita tai onko taustalla taudin 
tahallinen levittäminen, kuten bioterrorismi tai biologisen aseen käyttö.  
 
Biologisia uhkia voidaan vähentää tehokkaimmin ehkäisemällä epidemioiden syntyä 
paikallisesti. Biouhkamikrobit (esim. pernaruttobakteeri tai ebolavirus) aiheuttavat edel-
leen luonnollisia epidemioita. Kasvanut maailmanlaajuinen liikkuvuus on mahdollista-
nut taudinaiheuttajien nopean leviämisen ja lisännyt laajojen epidemioiden ja pandemian 
riskiä.  
 
Biolääketieteen uudet menetelmät ja tekniikat ovat entistä helpommin ja yhä useampien 
saatavilla. Tämä on tuonut uusia haasteita bioterrorismin ehkäisyyn ja kansainvälisen 
biologiset aseet kieltävän sopimuksen valvonnalle. Bioterrorismin uhkaa voidaan vähen-
tää tiedeyhteisön valveutuneisuutta lisäämällä sekä laboratorioturvallisuutta parantamalla 
ja näin estää vaarallisten mikrobien joutumista vääriin käsiin. Suomessa toimii Biologis-
ten uhkien osaamiskeskus, joka on Terveyden- ja hyvinvoinnin laitoksen ja Puolustus-
voimien logistiikkalaitokseen kuuluvan Sotilaslääketieteen keskuksen yhteinen asiantun-
tijaorganisaatio. Sen päätehtäviin kuuluu biologisiin uhkiin varautuminen. 
 
Biologisiin uhkiin varautumisessa taudinaiheuttajamikrobin nopea tunnistaminen on 
tärkeää, sillä se mahdollistaa vastatoimien ripeän suunnittelun ja toteutuksen. Perinteiset 
menetelmät taudinaiheuttajien tunnistamiseksi (esim. mikrobien viljely) ovat usein hitai-
ta tai epäherkkiä, joten molekyylibiologiset testit, kuten reaaliaikaiset geenimonistusme-
netelmät, ovat saavuttaneet keskeisen aseman taudinaiheuttajien diagnostiikassa. Luotet-
tavat, kenttäkelpoiset ja helppokäyttöiset tunnistusmenetelmät tehostavat operatiivista 
toimintakykyä biouhkatilanteissa. Samaa teknologiaa voidaan hyödyntää myös normaa-
liolojen diagnostiikassa.  
 
Tässä väitöskirjatyössä tutkittiin kenttäkäyttöön soveltuvien kannettavien reaaliaikaisten 
geenimonistusteknologian käytettävyyttä ja kykyä tunnistaa luotettavasti biouhkabaktee-
reita sekä hengitystieviruksia kenttäolosuhteissa. Työssä käytettiin kolmen biouhkabak-
teerin (Francisella tularensis (jänisruttobakteeri), Bacillus anthracis (pernaruttobakteeri) ja 
Yersinia pestis (ruttobakteeri)) ja influenssa A -viruksen tunnistavia menetelmiä. Työhön 
sisältyi lisäksi kenttäolosuhteisiin soveltuvien näytteiden esikäsittelymenetelmien tutki-
 v
minen. Väitöskirjatyössä selvitettiin myös geenisekvensaation avulla yleisimmät suoma-
laisissa varuskunnissa kiertävät ja hengitystieinfektioita aiheuttavat adenoviruksen ala-
tyypit. Geenisekvensointi on tärkeä työkalu epäillyn tahallisen levityksen tutkinnassa. 
Sen avulla saadaan tarkkaa tietoa taudinaiheuttajasta ja sen alkuperästä. 
 
Tulokset vahvistivat, että nykyaikaisella kenttäkelpoisella geenimonistusteknologialla ja 
kenttäkelpoisilla näytteen esikäsittelymenetelmillä saadaan nopeita ja luotettavia tuloksia 
kenttäolosuhteissa. Tällaista teknologiaa yhdistettynä geenisekvensointiin voidaan käyt-
tää työkaluna infektioepidemioiden selvitystyössä tai tutkittaessa epäiltyä taudinaiheutta-
jien tahallista levitystä. Väitöskirjatyön esittämiä menetelmiä voidaan käyttää kaikissa 
Puolustusvoimien päätehtävissä: maanpuolustuksessa, viranomaisyhteistyössä sekä kan-
sainvälisissä tehtävissä. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Biological threats arise from infectious agents and toxins capable of causing disease or 
epidemics in human or animal populations that require extraordinary response 
measures. They may emerge or re-emerge directly from natural wildlife or domestic 
animal sources, they may be transmitted via contaminated food and water, or they may 
be released deliberately as modes of bioterrorism (OIE World Organization for animal 
health, 2016). The spread of novel pathogens is facilitated by international travel, hu-
man migration, animal trade, natural disasters and climate change. These may lead to 
the unintentional introduction of pathogens and increase the global risk of infectious 
disease epidemics or pandemics. There is also the possibility of a deliberate release of 
pathogens or toxins as acts of terrorism. 
 
Rapid identification is essential for appropriate medical care, containment and control 
in the event of a release or natural outbreak of a contagious pathogen. Pathogens are 
usually identified by dedicated diagnostic laboratories and the methods typically require 
skilled staff, highly specific protocols and sophisticated equipment. Transporting sam-
ples to the laboratory risks a secondary release of the pathogen should an accident take 
place in transit, and appropriate counter-measures and medical action must wait for a 
confirmed diagnosis before being applied. Currently available rapid point-of-care tests 
often lack the analytical sensitivity to detect pathogens directly and reliably from clinical 
or environmental samples (Irenge and Gala, 2012, Zasada et al., 2015). As such, there is 
a great need for a portable, rapid and robust diagnostic tool for use at the release site 
wherever it may be (Irenge and Gala, 2012). 
 
Some pathogens circulating in nature sporadically cause human diseases that can lead to 
epidemics, particularly in developing countries. Although naturally-occurring, these 
pathogens are classified as potential bioterrorism agents belonging to the highest bio-
threat category. These pathogens can be weaponized for deliberate use and mass de-
struction. Deliberate use of bioweapons may be tempting for certain individuals or 
groups since preparing bioweapons is simpler and cheaper than chemical or nuclear 
devices. Recent and rapid advances in biomedicine have made the production of bio-
weapons easier for independent agencies and their use to effect harm or incite terror 
represents a growing concern around the world (OIE World Organization for animal 
health, 2016).  
 
Other pathogens such as respiratory viruses are causing significant outbreaks of illness 
throughout the world, especially in crowded places such as kindergartens, schools and 
military garrisons (Gray et al., 1999, O´Shea MK and Wilson D, 2013). 
 2
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The main purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate that modern portable thermocycler 
technology can generate data of a similar quality to that of dedicated laboratories with a 
fixed location. Field-deployable, point-of-care molecular diagnostic tools and molecular 
characterization of the pathogen can be used to monitor epidemics or to investigate 
suspected use of biological weapons. 
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2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Biological threats 
 
Biological threats may emerge directly from natural wildlife sources, or they may be 
released deliberately as acts of bioterrorism (OIE World Organization for animal 
health, 2016, National Institute for Health and Welfare, 2014a). 
 
Some biothreats cause diseases such as plague and anthrax and are classified as poten-
tial bioterrorism agents in the highest biothreat category (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), 2016a, Ryan, 2008). These pathogens can be turned into weap-
ons and used to infect a target population. The use of such weapons could result in a 
massive loss of life and cause economic, political, and social damage from local to glob-
al scale (Ryan, 2008). Progress in genetic engineering, synthetic biology and biomedical 
technique has simplified the development, production, storage and use of biological 
weapons (Kelle, 2013, Konig et al., 2013, Moe-Behrens et al., 2013, Riedel, 2004). In 
the wrong hands, just one of the deadly viruses or bacteria could cause a catastrophic 
loss of life. The possibility of using biological agents for malevolent purposes repre-
sents a growing concern for law enforcement, governments, and public health officials 
around the world (OIE World Organization for animal health, 2016). In response, initi-
atives such as the United Nations Secretary General Mechanism (UNSGM) for investi-
gating the alleged use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons (United Nations Office 
for Disarmament Affairs, 2016) have been developed. 
 
2.2 Zoonotic diseases – a global challenge 
 
Zoonotic diseases, or zoonoses, are infectious diseases caused by naturally-occurring 
pathogens that circulate within animal populations and which can be transmitted to 
humans under natural conditions. Zoonotic diseases are often categorized according to 
their route of transmission, pathogen type or infectivity among humans (Lloyd-Smith et 
al., 2009). Emerging infectious diseases are those that have increased recently or threat-
en to increase in the near future. Diseases that once were endemic and had since been 
eradicated or controlled but are again becoming health problems are re-emerging dis-
eases (Dikid et al., 2013). Emerging and re-emerging diseases have caused many pan-
demics in human history, e.g., the Black Death in 1346–1353 by Yersinia pestis and Span-
 4
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ish Influenza in 1918-1920 by influenza A H1N1 (Bos et al., 2011, Morens et al., 2008, 
Weber and Rutala, 1999, OIE World Organization for animal health, 2016, Woolhouse 
and Gowtage-Sequeria, 2005). 
 
New infectious diseases emerge because of many factors. Global processes such as cli-
mate change, rapid intercontinental travel, mass human migration, animal production 
and foreign trade with countries having high prevalence of pathogens and their vectors 
have all increased the risk of novel biological threats (Courtney et al., 2014, Lindahl and 
Grace, 2015). Urbanization implies a greater concentration and connectedness of peo-
ple and may increase the speed at which new infections can emerge and spread. Fur-
thermore, income growth is associated with rising animal protein consumption in de-
veloping countries, which increases the conversion of wild lands to livestock produc-
tion (Wu et al., 2016).  
 
Several human infectious diseases arose after the introduction of new agricultural tech-
niques (Wolfe et al., 2007). Nowadays, food-borne diseases are recognized as a high 
priority as there are many stages at which food safety can be compromised (Cohen, 
2000). Land-use changes (e.g., agricultural encroachment, deforestation, road construc-
tion, etc.) are drivers of infectious disease emergence and outbreak (Patz et al., 2004). 
Land modification and deforestation have a direct impact on vegetation, an indirect 
impact on host-vector dynamics, and increase human contact with wild animals and 
their zoonotic pathogens. An additional and often overlooked aspect of natural areas is 
their rich microbial diversity (Jones et al., 2008). Anti-microbial drug resistance has 
enormous significance for global health and is a serious problem (Cohen, 2000, Jones et 
al., 2008) that might only be solved by the identification and development of biochemi-
cals developed from existing microbes. Drug-resistant microbes represent a significant 
issue related to biothreat agents and bioterrorism (Zakowska et al., 2015). 
 
More than 75 % of human diseases are zoonotic and have links to wildlife and domes-
tic animals (Taylor et al., 2001). Zoonotic infection of a local human population can 
occur in many ways. Hunting, butchery and consumption of wild animals have led to 
the zoonotic transmission of several diseases (Hahn et al., 2000). Most of these (e.g., 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), 
pandemic influenza, and ebola) are caused by animal pathogens transmitted from wild-
life reservoirs to humans, often through an intermediate amplification host which are 
the source of infection for humans (Carroll et al., 2015, Gardy et al., 2015, Guan et al., 
2003, Haydon et al., 2002, Jones et al., 2008, Lagace-Wiens et al., 2010, Lebarbenchon 
et al., 2013, Rewar et al., 2015, Rouquet et al., 2005). Zoonoses are also transmitted by 
house pets (Damborg et al., 2015). In recent decades the world has faced new disease 
 5
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threats arising from the increasing ease and volume of air travel creating a single “glob-
al” community (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Global aviation network of today. Lines show connections between airports, and the 
color of the lines indicates passenger numbers per day. Modified from (Kilpatrick and Ran-
dolph, 2012).  
 
Zoonoses tend to affect developing countries and rural areas with poor access to health 
services where malnutrition can enhance susceptibility to infection (Cohen, 2000, Coker 
et al., 2011). Detection and control of diseases in situations of conflict and war are a 
major challenge. Conflicts result in a loss of adequate surveillance and response as well 
as a collapse of infrastructure and healthcare (Gayer et al., 2007). However, threats are 
not only limited to low-income countries or conflict zones due to expanded global 
trade and air travel (Karesh et al., 2012). The rapid spread of global diseases such as 
SARS and influenza demonstrates the speed with which human epidemics can emerge 
(Coker et al., 2011). 
 
The spread of zoonotic diseases is a global challenge as they represent a significant 
cause of illness and death each year (Cohen, 2000, Karesh et al., 2012). They place a 
great strain on healthcare and are the reason for huge economic losses in some coun-
tries (Jones et al., 2008, Karesh et al., 2005). Respiratory infections, HIV/AIDS and 
diarrheal diseases account for the most deaths attributable to infectious disease (Morens 
et al., 2004). 
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Effective prevention, enhanced biosafety and biosecurity measures, in concert with ef-
ficient detection technology are required to reduce the spread of infectious diseases. To 
develop and deploy rapid diagnostic tests and to train people in using them will im-
prove response to these infections and their outbreaks in an early phase when control 
measures are most effective in limiting the spread to the human population (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2016b). 
 
2.3 Selected high-priority agents 
 
The US CDC classifies pathogens according to their risk of  infection and scale of  
threat. Category A pathogens are high-priority agents that pose a risk to national or 
global security (Table 1). These agents can be easily spread or transmitted from person 
to person, are extremely virulent and result in high mortality rate, thus have the poten-
tial for a major public health impact. Release of such agents may result in panic and 
social disruption and requires special attention and action in order to attain public 
health preparedness (Katz and Zilinskas, 2011d). Category B pathogens are the second 
highest priority as they are moderately easy to spread and they result in low or moderate 
morbidity and mortality rates (Table 1). Category C pathogens could be engineered for 
deliberate use and they are more easily available than A and B category agents but also 
have the potential to create a major health impact (Table 1) (Katz and Zilinskas, 
2011d).  
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Table 1. List of risk-category A, B, and C pathogens and the diseases they cause (Katz and 
Zilinskas, 2011d). 
List of Category A-C agents 
  Agent Disease 
Category A 
Francisella tularensis  Tularemia 
Bacillus anthracis Anthrax 
Yersinia pestis Plague 
Clostridium botulinum toxin Botulism 
Variola major  Smallpox 
Arenaviruses, Bunyaviruses, Flaviviruses, Filoviruses Viral hemorrhagic fevers 
Category B 
Brucella species Brucellosis 
Clostridium perfringens (Epsilon toxin)  Foodborne illness  
Salmonella spp., Escherichia coli 0157:H7, Shigella spp. 
(foodborne pathogens)  
Burkholderia mallei Glanders 
Burkholderia pseudomallei Melioidosis 
Chlamydia psittaci Psittacosis 
Coxiella burnetii Q fever 
Ricinus communis, (ricin toxin), castor beans   
Staphylococcus aureus, (staphylococcal Enterotoxin B), 
SEB 
  
Rickettsia prowazekii Typhus fever 
Alphaviruses Viral encephalitis 
Vibrio cholerae Cholera 
Cryptosporidium parvum  Cryptosporidiosis  (parasitic disease) 
Influenza A virus Influenza 
Category C 
Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses   
Tickborne encephalitis viruses   
Yellow fever virus Yellow fever 
Multidrug resistant tuberculosis Tuberculosis 
Other Rickettsias   
Rabies virus (Lyssavirus spp.) Rabies 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coro-
navirus (SARS-CoV)   
 
CDC lists three bacterial species as category A biological threat agents: Francisella tu-
larensis, Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis. These bacterial agents are zoonotic and highly 
pathogenic and virulent, potentially causing high case fatality and thus pose a major risk 
to public health (Anderson and Bokor, 2012). The risks these bacteria pose are ampli-
fied by their ability to be transmitted through aerosols (Katz and Zilinskas, New Jersey: 
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John Wiley & Sons, Inc; 2011.), and an incubation period of up to several weeks fol-
lowing human exposure (Anderson and Bokor, 2012, Dennis et al., 2001, Koskela and 
Salminen, 1985) which makes determining the source of infection more difficult. 
 
These three pathogens can present as invisible, odorless and tasteless aerosols and their 
release can be difficult to detect initially in a population that is unaware of its exposure. 
Related to this is the issue of psychological damage and stress suffered by a public fac-
ing a constant threat of biological agents (Katz and Zilinskas, 2011e). Rapid identifica-
tion and accurate characterization of these agents is therefore essential for the swift 
application of appropriate counter-measures as well as primary care and control proto-
cols. Moreover, timely post-exposure antibiotic treatment, enabled by rapid detection 
and identification, can protect against infections caused by these agents (Irenge and 
Gala, 2012, Ivnitski et al., 2003). 
 
2.3.1 Francisella tularensis 
 
Francisella tularensis is the causal agent of the zoonotic disease tularemia. In addition to 
the mode of transmission, severity of illness depends on bacterial subtype. The clinical-
ly most relevant subtypes are F. tularensis tularensis (type A) and F. tularensis holarctica 
(type B). F. tularensis tularensis is highly pathogenic for humans and is the main causal 
agent of tularemia in North America, whereas F. tularensis holarctica is less virulent and 
widely distributed in many animal species in Eurasia (Tarnvik et al., 2004). Tularemia 
presents a wide variety of primary clinical symptoms in humans, which depend on the 
route of infection. The infectious dose of F. tularensis is low. Infection in humans can 
occur after exposure to as little as 10–50 colony-forming units (CFUs) and the incuba-
tion period for tularemia can range from 1 to 14 days (Dennis et al., 2001, Koskela and 
Salminen, 1985). The bacteria can be transmitted by insect bites, contaminated water, 
food and aerosols (Foley and Nieto, 2010) and remain infectious over long periods of 
time in cool and humid environments (Whitehouse and Hottel, 2007). In Fennoscandia, 
the disease is believed to be mainly transmitted via mosquitoes. However, the ecology 
of tularemia is not clearly understood and the natural reservoir of the bacterium is not 
yet established, although rodents are suspected to be involved. In support of a rodent 
reservoir, tularemia outbreaks are associated with poor hygienic conditions, especially in 
war and post-war situations when rodent densities are typically high (Grunow et al., 
2012). Several tularemia outbreaks have been described (Rossow et al., 2014), including 
cases in the Soviet Union during World War II (Sjostedt, 2007) and in Scandinavian 
and other European countries, (Christenson, 1984, Dahlstrand, Sverker., Ringertz, Ol-
of., Zetterberg, Bo., 1971, Splettstoesser et al., 2009). In Finland, tularemia (F. tularensis 
holarctica) is endemic and seasonal cases are seen in the late summer and early fall (Ros-
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sow et al., 2014, Tarnvik et al., 2004). During 1995–2016, the National Infectious Dis-
eases Register received 5832 notifications of laboratory confirmed tularemia cases (Fig-
ure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Since 1995, nearly 6000 cases of tularemia have been reported. Rodents act as ampli-
fication hosts of F. tularensis, and high rodent densities predict tularemia cases in humans in the 
following year (Rossow, 2015). 
 
2.3.2 Bacillus anthracis 
 
B. anthracis is an endospore-forming bacteria and the causal agent of anthrax. The bacte-
rium forms resistant spores that enable the organism to survive long periods in harsh 
conditions outside of an animal host (Williams et al., 2013).  Three forms of anthrax are 
known. In the cutaneous form, spores of B. anthracis pass through minor skin breaks, 
resulting in the formation of dermal ulcers. Over 95 % of anthrax cases are of cutane-
ous form and result from direct contact with spores or live bacteria (Anderson and 
Bokor, 2012). The second form is gastro-intestinal, which occurs most commonly after 
ingestion of poorly-cooked meat contaminated with spores. The third form is inhala-
tion anthrax, caused by breathing in spores. Gastrointestinal and inhalation anthrax 
have high case fatality rates when not treated. The infective dose of B. anthracis is re-
ported to be approximately 8000–10000 spores (Cowcher et al., 2013, Katz and Zilin-
skas, 2011c). The incubation period for inhalational anthrax is usually less than a week 
but in some rare cases much longer. Person-to-person transmission of anthrax has not 
been reported (Anderson and Bokor, 2012). The disease occurs naturally in many parts 
of the world with the highest incidence in sub-Saharan Africa and central Asia (Katz 
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and Zilinskas, 2011a). Furthermore, both accidental and deliberate releases of B. anthra-
cis have been reported (Dixon et al., 1999, Jernigan et al., 2002, U.S Department of De-
fence, 2015, Sternbach, 2003). 
 
2.3.3 Yersinia pestis 
 
Yersinia pestis is the causal agent of the systemic invasive infectious disease, plague. The 
bacterium is primarily a rodent pathogen, usually transmitted to humans by the bite of 
an infected flea, but can also be transmitted by air (saliva droplets) during plague pan-
demics and epidemics (Parkhill et al., 2001, Raoult et al., 2013, World Health Organiza-
tion, 6 September 2015). Pneumonic plague may also spread from person-to-person 
(Butler, 2009, Raoult et al., 2013). The estimated infective dose of Y. pestis is approxi-
mately 1000 bacterial cells. The infective dose of Y. pestis is therefore less than for B. 
anthracis, but more than F. tularensis (Katz and Zilinskas, 2011c). The incubation period 
for airborne plague can range from 1 to 10 days (Anderson and Bokor, 2012), (World 
Health Organization, 2016). Most symptoms will subside with antibiotic treatment. 
Plague has caused several major epidemics in Europe and Asia over the last 2000 years, 
and in the 14th century it killed more than one-third of the population of Europe within 
a few years (Katz and Zilinskas, 2011c). Furthermore, allegations of the use of Y. pestis 
during World War II have been presented (Frischknecht, 2003). Today, up to 3000 cas-
es of plague are reported annually to the World Health Organization (World Health 
Organization, 2005).  
 
2.4 Common pathogens causing respiratory infections in Finnish garrisons 
 
Respiratory tract infections cause morbidity and mortality worldwide (Zumla et al., 
2014). Upper respiratory tract infections (URTI) are the most common infectious dis-
eases among persons of all age groups and they are mostly caused by viruses. Occasion-
ally these viruses reach the lower respiratory tract, causing bronchitis, bronchiolitis and 
pneumonia, which can be severe, even life-threatening (Jamison DT, Breman JG, 
Measham AR, et al., 2006). Respiratory viruses are easily transmitted in high population 
densities, such as in day-care centers, schools, and military garrisons. Overcrowding, 
physical and mental stress and frequent traveling may predispose an individual to res-
piratory tract pathogens (Gray et al., 1999, O´Shea MK and Wilson D, 2013). Respira-
tory infections have been recognized for a long time as common illnesses among mili-
tary recruits during their service (Sanchez et al., 2001, Top, 1975). Adenoviruses, influ-
enza A and B viruses, Streptococcus pneumoniae and Streptococcus pyogenes have been recog-
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nized as the primary causal agents in acute respiratory infections (ARI) of army person-
nel (Gray et al., 1999, Wang et al., 2010). 
 
Respiratory viruses are the source of significant outbreaks of illness among military 
conscripts in Finland each year, commonly during late winter and early spring (Hulkko 
et al., 2010). Finnish garrisons actively participate in the sentinel surveillance of viral 
respiratory infections coordinated by the National Institute for Health and Welfare 
(THL). This surveillance provides detailed information on the circulation of various 
respiratory viruses in the Finnish population as well as on the characteristics of these 
viruses. Outbreaks of influenza A and adenoviruses are registered every year. Other 
common viruses causing respiratory infections are presented in the sentinel surveillance 
material (Figure 3) (Hulkko et al., 2010). Kauppila et. al (2014) monitored respiratory 
infections in military recruits in eastern Finland in 2004–2005. PCR results were posi-
tive for the presence of influenza virus types A, B, and C, adenovirus, parainfluen-
zavirus types 1, 2 and 3, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), human metapneumovirus 
(hMPV), rhinovirus, enterovirus, Chlamydia pneumoniae, and Mycoplasma pneumoniae 
(Kauppila et al., 2014). Furthermore, microbiological swabs taken during acute rhinosi-
nusitis in a cohort of 50 Finnish military recruits included Haemophilus influenzae, Strepto-
coccus pneumoniae and Neisseria meningitis (Autio et al., 2015). Particularly in garrisons, epi-
demics caused by respiratory infections are often characterized by a sudden onset, and 
the rapid identification of the pathogen may help in planning appropriate counter-
measures and treatment strategies. Some of the common respiratory pathogens are also 
related to severe epidemics or pandemics (i.e., influenza A and adenoviruses) and have 
been detected in military personnel (Byerly, 2010, Hoke and Snyder, 2013, Morens et 
al., 2010). 
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Figure 3. Findings from acute respiratory infection surveillance during 2014-2015 in Finnish 
garrisons. Modified from (National Institute for Health and Welfare). 
 
2.4.1 Influenza A viruses 
 
Influenza viruses are a major cause of human acute respiratory disease globally (Katz 
and Zilinskas, 2011b). In Finland, annual epidemics caused by influenza A virus are 
recorded with morbidity and mortality. Therefore, risk groups are vaccinated free of 
charge through a national vaccination program. In the Finnish Defense Forces seasonal 
influenza epidemics are seen annually, particularly among military recruits undergoing 
basic training during the winter months (Hulkko et al., 2010). An influenza vaccine has 
been offered to all conscripts entering service since 2012. 
 
Influenza viruses are members of the orthomyxovirus family and there are four types 
known as A, B, C and D. Influenza A and B viruses are both responsible for the annual 
epidemics. Influenza C viruses cause low-level sporadic disease with limited outbreaks 
and occur almost exclusively in humans (Cox and Subbarao, 2000, Taubenberger and 
Morens, 2010). Influenza D virus is a novel pathogen with bovine as its primary host 
(Sreenivasan et al., 2015). Influenza A can sporadically cause pandemics (Cox and Sub-
barao, 2000).  
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Influenza ecology is complicated because of the presence of avian and mammalian viral 
reservoirs. Several bird species serve as large reservoirs for influenza A viruses (Cox 
and Subbarao, 2000, LaForce et al., 1994). Influenza A viruses can occasionally jump 
from one host species to another and subsequently diversify into one or more new line-
ages within the new host (Taubenberger and Morens, 2010). Avian influenza viruses 
can sometimes infect mammals, and pigs are often infected with both avian and mam-
malian strains (Cox and Subbarao, 2000). Therefore, pigs may serve as a reservoir for 
the mixing and re-assortment of mammalian and avian strains, potentially resulting in 
antigenic shift. This potential for the pig to function as a viral mixing vessel has been 
used partly to explain why China and Southeast Asia have been a source of past epi-
demic and pandemic influenza viruses. In these regions, humans, domestic fowl and 
pigs occur at a density not seen anywhere else on Earth (Cox and Subbarao, 2000), 
(LaForce et al., 1994). Amplification of influenza viruses during epidemics and pan-
demics can potentially lead to new and possibly more virulent viruses, or to viruses re-
sistant to antiviral drugs (Lagace-Wiens et al., 2010).  
 
In the northern hemisphere, seasonal influenza typically circulates from November to 
March (Cox and Subbarao, 2000, Monto, 2008). The primary modes of transmission 
are saliva-droplet aerosols and direct contact with the virus on contaminated surfaces 
and foods. Increased crowding during the colder months (e.g., in schools, kindergartens 
and military barracks) is a contributing factor to epidemics (Cox and Subbarao, 2000, 
LaForce et al., 1994, Monto, 2008). Typical seasonal influenza infections are associated 
with classical symptoms, such as four to five days of fever, chills, headache, muscle 
pain, weakness and often upper respiratory symptoms and cough (Monto, 2008). The 
average annual influenza mortality in developed countries is approximately 12 in 
100,000 persons (Monto, 2008). 
 
Followed by the appearance of a new influenza A subtype in humans, three major pan-
demics have occurred during the 20th century; the 1918–1919 pandemic (H1N1), the 
1957–1958 pandemic (H2N2) and the 1968 pandemic (H3N2) causing many deaths as 
well as a considerable economic impact (Cox and Subbarao, 2000, Kilbourne, 2006, 
Morens et al., 2010). In spring 2009, a novel influenza A virus emerged in North Amer-
ica and rapidly spread around the globe (Gardy et al., 2015).  
 
In June 2009, the World Health Organization declared the onset of the first influenza 
pandemic in over 40 years (CDC, 2010, Lagace-Wiens et al., 2010, Morens et al., 2010). 
Epidemiological studies have shown that elderly individuals had protective antibodies 
against this novel virus (Ikonen et al., 2010). In addition, (H1N1)pdm09 viruses re-
sistant to antiviral neuraminidase inhibitors have been detected only occasionally (Laga-
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ce-Wiens et al., 2010). Fortunately, the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic virus was not as path-
ogenic as, for example, H5N1 (Peiris et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the World Bank esti-
mated the viral pandemic cost the global economy close to three trillion US dollars (La-
gace-Wiens et al., 2010).  
 
Advances in healthcare and technology have had a major impact on influenza mortality 
figures. Increased public awareness, preventive strategies, early diagnosis and treatment 
have improved dramatically. However, as a large portion of the global population does 
not have access to the same level of prevention and medical care as developed coun-
tries, challenges remain in medical capacity and resource availability (Morens et al., 
2010).  
 
2.4.2 Adenoviruses 
 
Adenoviruses are a common cause of acute respiratory disease globally. For many years, 
acute respiratory illnesses associated with adenoviruses have been reported among 
adults and military populations (Gray et al., 2000). The first human adenovirus was iso-
lated in 1954 in the United States from military recruits with febrile respiratory illness 
(FRI) (Hilleman and Werner, 1954). Epidemics caused by adenoviruses can exhibit high 
levels of morbidity (Potter et al., 2012), and they can cause a wide range of clinical man-
ifestations, ranging from mild to severe infections. The most common clinical symp-
toms of adenovirus infections are similar to the common cold and an upper respiratory 
infection often accompanied by fever, and occasionally developing into bronchitis and 
pneumonia (Kunz and Ottolini, 2010). Some adenoviruses are related to follicular con-
junctivitis or pharyngoconjunctival fever and highly contagious keratoconjunctivitis and 
tonsillitis (German et al., 2008, Lenaerts et al., 2008, Ylikoski and Karjalainen, 1989). 
Among immunocompetent individuals, adenovirus infections are generally mild but 
sometimes, particularly in immunocompromised patients, adenovirus infections can 
cause severe disease (Tebruegge and Curtis, 2012). Currently, over 60 human adenovi-
rus serotypes are known and are divided into subgroups A–G (Ghebremedhin, 2014, 
Robinson et al., 2013). Among adults, adenovirus subgroup B (serotypes 3, 7 and 21), 
subgroup C (serotypes 1, 2 and 5) and subgroup E (serotype 4) are common causes of 
respiratory tract infections and have been associated with outbreaks (Brosch et al., 
2009, Kajon et al., 2015, Lu et al., 2013).  
 
A vaccine against certain adenovirus serotypes was first introduced in 1971 but the 
manufacturer then ceased production in 1996. In 2011, the US Food and Drug Admin-
istration approved a program to resume vaccinating recruits with an oral vaccine against 
adenovirus types 4 and 7, resulting in a dramatic decrease of adenovirus-associated res-
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piratory disease in army training centers (Hoke and Snyder, 2013, Potter et al., 2012, 
Radin et al., 2014). Kajon et al. (2015) reported the genomic characterization of adeno-
virus types from unvaccinated US military recruits presenting FRI symptoms during a 
15-year period (1996–2011). Additional strains isolated from civilians were character-
ized for comparison. Results suggested that adenovirus type 4 was the dominant causal 
agent of FRI among adults. Furthermore, adenovirus types 7, 3, 14 and 21 were well 
represented (Kajon et al., 2015, Kajon et al., 2010). In the 1960s, Mäntyjärvi et al., 
(1966) recognized by serological methods that mainly adenovirus serotypes 3, 4 and 14 
were circulating in Finnish servicemen (Mantyjarvi, 1966). Overall, the Finnish Defense 
Forces has had little information on the adenovirus serotypes circulating in Finland. 
 
2.5 Biological Warfare Agents (BWA) 
Infectious agents were used in warfare as early as 600 BC. The use of filth, cadavers, 
animal carcasses and contagion was noticed to weaken the enemy. Also, polluting a 
water supply was a commonly used tactic in siege warfare (Barras and Greub, 2014, 
Riedel, 2004, Wagar, 2016). The use of biological weapons became more sophisticated 
as microbiology made the isolation and production of specific pathogens possible and 
affordable (Riedel, 2004). These and other contamination strategies were used in many 
wars. Allegations of the use of cattle inoculated with disease-producing bacteria were 
reported during World War I (Riedel, 2004, Wagar, 2016) (Table 2). During and after 
World War II, several countries had offensive biological warfare research programs 
(Table 2) (Carus, 2015, Riedel, 2004). These programs focused on pathogens that could 
be easily spread and which were very infective with a significant mortality rate. Nowa-
days, these pathogens are listed in risk categories A–C by the CDC (CDC, 2015) (Table 
1). Furthermore, several assassination attempts and terrorist attacks as well as allega-
tions related to biological warfare research have been reported (D'Amelio et al., 2015, 
Riedel, 2004). The exact use of biological weapons in history remains difficult to de-
termine because microbiological and epidemiological data are lacking, and the weight of 
political propaganda and issues with military secrecy will always obscure the real picture 
(Barras and Greub, 2014). 
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Table 2. Examples of biological warfare use during World War I and II. 
World War I German and French agents used glanders
(Pseudomonas pseudomallei) and anthrax (Ba-
cillus anthracis) 
World War II Japan used plague (Yersinia pestis), anthrax
(Bacillus anthracis), and other pathogens, 
and several other countries experimented 
with and developed biological weapons 
programs 
 
2.6 The Biological Weapon Convention (BWC) 
 
In response to the use of chemical warfare during World War I, efforts were made to 
limit the proliferation and use of biological and chemical weapons. On June 17, 1925, 
the “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” commonly called the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925, was signed by 108 nations. The Geneva Protocol did not address 
verification or compliance, making it a less meaningful document. Thus, during the late 
1960s, concerns were raised regarding epidemiologic risks and the lack of control 
measures for biological weapons (Riedel, 2004). 
 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly 
known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), opened for signature in 1972 
and became active in 1975 (The United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) ). Finland 
ratified the convention in 1974. The BWC was the first multilateral disarmament treaty 
banning an entire category of weapons, and is a key element in the international com-
munity’s efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It further 
required the parties to the BWC to destroy stockpiles, BWA delivery systems, and pro-
duction equipment within nine months of ratifying the treaty (Riedel, 2004, The United 
Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG)). The BWC prohibits the development, produc-
tion, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or tox-
ins whatever their origin or method of production, of types that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, also weapons, equipment or 
means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in 
armed conflict (The United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG)). Under the conven-
tion, the development of delivery systems and the transfer of biological warfare tech-
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nology or expertise to other countries are also prohibited (The United Nations Office 
at Geneva (UNOG)). 
 
At present, BWC has 175 state parties and nine signatories (Table 3) while there are 13 
states which have neither signed nor ratified the convention (Table 4) (The United Na-
tions Office at Geneva (UNOG), 2015). The Seventh Review Conference in 2011 
agreed "that a concerted effort by states parties is needed to persuade states not party 
to join the Convention" (The United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), 2011). 
 
Table 3. Nine states have signed but not ratified the BWC as of October 2016. 
States with signatories but not ratified
Angola, Central African Republic, Egypt, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Somalia, 
Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania 
 
Table 4. Thirteen States have neither signed nor ratified the BWC as of October 2016. 
States neither signed nor ratified
Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, Namibia, Niue, 
Samoa, South Sudan, Tuvalu 
 
2.7 Biosafety and Biosecurity 
 
Biosafety determines the principles, technologies, practices and measures to prevent the 
accidental release of or unintentional exposure to biological agents and toxins (Dick-
mann et al., 2015). A biosafety protocol determines who may handle the pathogens and 
where they are handled, as when working with pathogens there is always a risk to be 
considered and assessed. It also includes the control of biological samples and material 
related to samples, i.e., an inventory of samples and laboratory devices (Dybwad et al., 
2013, The United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), 2008, Weiss et al., 2015, World 
Health Organization, 2004).  
 
Biosecurity aims to prevent pathogens ending up in the wrong hands (Jernigan et al., 
2002). Special microbiological practices enhance work safety and environmental protec-
tion. Pathogen risk groups require different levels of containment (Table 5) (World 
Health Organization, 2004). In Finland, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has 
also set a classification of biological agents for protection of laboratory personnel relat-
ed to dangers caused by biological agents (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health). 
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Table 5. The World Health Organization (WHO) has established an agent risk group classifica-
tion for laboratory use that describes four general risk groups. They correlate with but do not 
equate to biosafety levels (World Health Organization, 2004). 
 
Risk group classification 
Risk group 1 
No or low individual and community 
risk. A microorganism unlikely to cause 
human or animal disease. 
Risk group 2 
Moderate individual risk and low 
community risk. A pathogen that can 
cause human or animal disease but is 
unlikely to be a serious hazard. 
Risk group 3 
High individual risk and low communi-
ty risk. A pathogen that usually causes 
serious human or animal disease but 
does not ordinarily spread from one 
infected individual to another. 
Risk group 4 
High individual and community risk. 
A pathogen that usually causes serious 
human or animal disease and can be 
readily transmitted from one individual 
to another. Effective treatment and 
preventive measures are not usually 
available. 
 
Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) is suitable for work involving well-characterized agents that 
present minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and environment. BSL-1 la-
boratories are not necessarily of restricted access beyond that of the main building 
(World Health Organization, 2004). Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) is suitable for work in-
volving agents that pose a moderate hazard to personnel and the environment. Labora-
tory personnel have specific training in handling pathogenic agents. Access to the la-
boratory is restricted when work is being conducted (World Health Organization, 
2004). Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) is suitable for work with indigenous or exotic agents 
which may cause serious or potentially lethal disease through the inhalation route or 
other exposure. Laboratory personnel must receive specific training in handling patho-
genic and potentially lethal agents. A BSL-3 laboratory has special engineering and de-
sign features (World Health Organization, 2004). Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) is required 
to work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of aerosol-
transmitted laboratory infections and life-threatening disease that is frequently fatal, for 
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which there are no vaccines or treatments. Laboratory personnel must have specific 
training in handling extremely hazardous infectious agents. BSL-4 laboratories have 
special engineering and design features to prevent microorganisms from being dissemi-
nated into the environment (World Health Organization, 2004). 
 
Biosecurity refers to “protection, control and accountability measures implemented to 
prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of biological agents and 
toxins and related resources as well as unauthorized access to, retention or transfer of 
such material” (Dickmann et al., 2015). 
 
Related to biosafety and biosecurity there is also a risk of dual use of biological material 
(Resnik, 2009). Dual-use research includes, for example, enhancing the pathogenic po-
tential of a microorganism, engineering a pathogen to render it undetectable with 
known detection methods or assays, or making a pathogen resistant to vaccines or to 
antibiotics or antiviral drugs. Scientists have a professional and ethical responsibility to 
understand the concept of dual use as there is a potential risk that biological material, 
technologies or results from the research may end up being used for harmful purposes. 
Sharing information, risk assessments and response mechanisms in order to strengthen 
biological safety, security and preparedness can minimize the risk (Kozlovac and 
Schmitt, 2015, Patrone et al., 2012). Dual use should also be considered when creating 
new biological substances that could possibly cause serious harm, or producing new 
delivery systems for biological substances with aerosols, drinking water, foodstuffs, etc. 
(Tumpey et al., 2005). Progress in biotechnology (Konig et al., 2013, Moe-Behrens et 
al., 2013) has simplified the development and production of new substances (Kelle, 
2013, Riedel, 2004). As an example, Tumpey et al. (2005) reconstructed the 1918 Span-
ish influenza pandemic virus and studied its properties in cell cultures and in mice. The 
research community discussed the risk of intentional spread of this deadly virus to the 
human population (Tumpey et al., 2005). Another example of potential risk of dual use 
are synthesized biological pathogens. Cello et al. (2002) presented chemical synthesis of 
poliovirus cDNA by preparing a generation of infectious virus in the absence of the 
natural template (Cello et al., 2002, Wimmer, 2006). However, this is technically de-
manding with the current technology. 
 
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. 
Proliferation of WMDs is a serious concern and constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security, and several treaties have been concluded to prevent the spread of 
these weapons. These treaties include the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (CWC). Finland is fully committed to the implementation of these conventions 
(University of Helsinki - Verifin, 2009). The Finnish Biosafety and Biosecurity Network 
was founded in 2012, including both governmental and non-governmental parties. The 
 20
 
????????????????????
 
  
network aims to promote biosafety and biosecurity and related practices in Finnish mi-
crobiological laboratories, currently focusing on BSL-3. The main activities of the net-
work are to provide education and to raise awareness through training and seminars on 
biosafety and biosecurity, biorisk management, dual use and best laboratory practices 
(National Institute for Health and Welfare, 2014b). 
 
2.8 Mobile biological laboratories 
 
The advantages of mobile laboratories have been recently recognized (Wolfel et al., 
2015, Grolla et al., 2011, Inglis et al., 2008). For example, the Bundeswehr Medical 
Mobile Laboratory (BML) and the European Mobile Laboratory (EMLab) are able to 
diagnose and investigate unusual disease outbreaks or events at the site of infection or 
release, e.g., in the recent Ebola outbreak in West-Africa (Wolfel et al., 2015). Field la-
boratories such as BML and EMLab comprise inflatable tent structures containing 
sealed partitions in which all supplies and equipment can be maintained and operated 
under clean and controlled conditions (Grolla et al., 2011, Wolfel et al., 2015).  
Field laboratories have been set up to support disease control efforts. The ability to 
place laboratory services close to an infected population can help with the early identi-
fication of the pathogen involved (Inglis et al., 2011). As such, field laboratories must 
be sufficiently portable, robust and able to operate independently (Inglis, 2013). Rapid 
and accurate identification of the causal agent(s) is critical for the effective containment 
of outbreaks and for providing appropriate care to those exposed (Grolla et al., 2012, 
Inglis, 2013, Towner et al., 2006). Biosafety in a mobile laboratory is achieved by having 
highly trained and experienced personnel applying optimized laboratory protocols. 
Equipment can be decontaminated with approved chemical or heat treatments before 
and/or after use (Wolfel et al., 2015). Military use of field laboratories also provides 
remote monitoring and on-site investigation of unusual disease outbreaks or terrorist 
attacks (Wolfel et al., 2015). 
 
2.8.1 The Finnish Mobile Diagnostic CBRN Field Laboratory 
 
The Finnish Defence Forces have developed and introduced Operational CBRN De-
fence Units for national defence. The Diagnostic Deployable CBRN Laboratory has 
been designed and established for international missions as well as domestic use (Kin-
nunen et al., 2012, Siekkinen et al., 2012), and the unit has been evaluated and approved 
by NATO. 
The Diagnostic Deployable CBRN Laboratory can be used for all three major tasks of 
the Finnish Defense Forces: 1. national defense of Finnish territory and population; 2. 
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support the Finnish authorities to secure the society, and; 3. aid international crisis 
management operations. The field laboratory can be used in a variety of defense pur-
poses, including natural outbreaks and deliberate release incidents. The laboratory can 
be transported by land, sea or air, and is fully operational within 72h without external 
support (Figure 4). The trailer of the laboratory has been designed for laboratory opera-
tion in all climate conditions with its own electricity, water and fuel supply. The field 
laboratory includes four separate modules that analyze chemical (C), biological (B), ra-
diological/nuclear (RN), and field hygiene (FH) samples (Figure 5). The B laboratory is 
designed to identify pathogens in biological samples and satisfies BSL-3 requirements. 
Under normal circumstances, a negative air pressure (-30 Pa) is maintained in the B 
laboratory, but in the case of a CBRN-related situation or in the presence of smoke or 
dust, the interior can be pressurized to +50 Pa relative to the outside environment. The 
incoming air is CBRN-filtered, and an air conditioning system maintains air tempera-
ture at a desired level. Exhaust air is filtered through double high efficiency particulate 
air filters (Kinnunen et al., 2012, Siekkinen et al., 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4. The Diagnostic Deployable CBRN Laboratory of the Finnish Defense Forces can be 
transported also by air (Deployable CBRN Field Laboratory transported by air, reprinted with 
the kind permission of the Finnish Defence Forces). 
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Figure 5. The Diagnostic Deployable CBRN Laboratory of the Finnish Defense Forces in-
cludes four separate laboratory modules, analyzing chemical (C), biological (B), radiologi-
cal/nuclear (RN), and field hygiene (FH) samples (Deployable CBRN Field Laboratory, re-
printed with the kind permission of the Finnish Defence Forces). 
 
The B laboratory also includes a microbiological safety cabinet (MSC) line. The two 
MSCs (class III and II) are connected by a dunk tank located under the benchtops. The 
B laboratory includes all necessary analytical instruments including equipment for sam-
ple preparation, real-time PCR thermocyclers for sensitive nucleic acid detection, and 
immunoanalyzers for rapid antigen and antibody detection. Sample material is subjected 
to nucleic acid extraction which inactivates biological agents. The purified nucleic acid 
preparations are then transferred through the dunk tank to the class II MSC for setting 
up PCR testing and subsequent analysis, whereas used equipment and waste are steri-
lized using the pass-through autoclave. Surface decontaminants, hydrogen peroxide 
fumigation, and an autoclave are used for decontamination and waste disposal. In addi-
tion to rapid field detection, the field laboratory may be used for collection of forensic 
evidence related to possible cases of alleged use of biological agents (Kinnunen et al., 
2012, Siekkinen et al., 2012). 
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2.8.2 The CBRN reconnaissance team and the forensic sampling team 
 
The field laboratory capabilities are combined with the field experience and expertise of 
the CBRN reconnaissance, decontamination and sampling team and associated medical 
personnel. The field laboratory and its crew can collect operational and forensic sam-
ples and perform analyses and identification of chemical, biological and radiological 
agents. The laboratory personnel work closely with the team responsible for forensic 
sampling and identification of biological, chemical and radiological agents (SIBCRA 
team) (Figure 6). The team unit consists of a leader and specialists in C, B, or RN, de-
pending on the mission. In forensic sampling, documentation and sample chain-of-
custody play critical roles while evidence quality is determined by sample collection and 
processing and by their demonstrable link to the CBRN event (Kinnunen et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 6. The CBRN-reconnaissance team investigating an unknown sample during a military 
exercise (The CBRN-reconnaissance team, reprinted with the kind permission of the Finnish 
Defence Forces). 
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2.9 Rapid point-of-care diagnostic tests 
 
Rapid identification and accurate characterization of a pathogen play a key role in the 
initiation of appropriate control measures and medical treatment (Irenge and Gala, 
2012, Ivnitski et al., 2003). Furthermore, Nouvellet et al. (2015) estimated that rapid 
diagnostic tests in combination with confirmatory testing could have reduced the scale 
of the 2013–2015 ebola epidemic in West Africa by over a third. 
 
Several diagnostic tools are available for the detection and identification of biological 
agents, e.g., plate culture, molecular methods, immunofluorescent and gram staining, 
antigen detection with immunoassays, and serological techniques (Grunow et al., 2000). 
However, relatively fast diagnostic tests, such as those based on immunoassay chemis-
try, often have limited sensitivity (Irenge and Gala, 2012, Zasada et al., 2015) while oth-
ers, such as conventional plate culture, require specialized microbiological laboratories 
and lengthy processing times to obtain conclusive results (Grunow et al., 2000, Hatch-
ette et al., 2009). 
 
Robust and reliable equipment for the detection and characterization of pathogens is 
often large, heavy and in other ways unsuitable for mobile diagnostics. Transporting 
samples to a fixed-location laboratory may take several hours or even days. A field-
ready and reliable diagnostic response capability is urgently required for use at the point 
of first detection or centre of exposure in order to identify the causal agent, provide 
primary care, and monitor and control the spread (Inglis, 2013). 
 
2.9.1 Antigen detection tests 
 
Immunoanalytical methods are based on the specific affinity between microbial anti-
gens and antibodies. These methods can be applied in the rapid detection of bacteria, 
viruses and toxins and have been developed primarily for point-of-care (POC) diagnos-
tics and field testing. Some of the antigen detection tests require powered automatic 
instruments (Jokela et al., 2015, Gunell et al., 2016). These tests have been suggested to 
be more sensitive (Jokela et al., 2015) than commonly used lateral-flow tests (de la Tab-
la et al., 2010, Irenge and Gala, 2012, Zasada et al., 2015), and have been applied in 
healthcare centers (Gunell et al., 2016). 
 
Lateral-?ow tests have been developed primarily for rapid ?eld diagnostics, but can also 
be useful for clinical laboratories (Ferris et al., 2009, Nouvellet et al., 2015). Lateral-flow 
tests are small strips and easily adaptable for field use and biothreat protocols. The ad-
vantage of the strip tests are their user-friendly format, short processing time and long-
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term stability over a wide range of climate conditions and they are also relatively inex-
pensive to manufacture (Ferris et al., 2009, Liu et al., 2016, Nouvellet et al., 2015, Zasa-
da et al., 2015). These single-use assays are based on immunochromatographic or im-
munoenzymatic techniques. Colored end-products con?rm or reject the presence of 
the target. Antigen-detection assays are based on an antibody-coated membrane, and 
use capillary ?ow for the elution of labeled antibodies conjugated with target antigens 
in the liquid phase. The complex formed by the antigen and the labeled antibodies mi-
grates along the test membrane and binds to the stationary antibody in the test mem-
brane, forming a visible result line. The test strip also contains an integrated control 
system with a line to indicate a complete and successful assay (Figure 7) (Lee et al., 
2013, Parolo et al., 2013). 
 
 
Figure 7. A complex formed by the sample antigen and labeled antibodies migrates through an 
antibody-coated membrane via capillary flow. The strip includes test and control lines, and 
results (both test and control) are read as visible lines. 
 
Although these assays are easy and fast to perform, they sometimes lack sensitivity 
(Irenge and Gala, 2012, Zasada et al., 2015). Thus, infected individuals may be misdiag-
nosed and returned to the population without further treatment (Nouvellet et al., 2015). 
However, the rapid assays may be useful for initial screening for the presence of biolog-
ical agents (Ferris et al., 2009). Positive results can be further con?rmed to exclude 
false-positive results by more sensitive gold standard tests, such as PCR or other nucle-
ic acid detection tests (Nouvellet et al., 2015). Lateral-?ow tests have been developed 
by many companies for biological threat agents, respiratory viruses and several toxins 
(Kanwar et al., 2015, Mirski et al., 2014, Rodriguez et al., 2015, Sambursky et al., 2006). 
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Due to suboptimal sensitivity of some of the rapid immunoassay detection tests availa-
ble, nucleic acid detection assays are becoming increasingly important for fast, sensitive 
and specific identification of pathogens (Grunow et al., 2000, Hatchette et al., 2009, 
Irenge and Gala, 2012). Therefore, rapid immunoassay detection tests confirmed with 
real-time PCR have been suggested to be an effective combination, and can be em-
ployed in the field to control an epidemic by quickly isolating and treating infected pa-
tients (Nouvellet et al., 2015). 
 
2.9.2 Nucleic acid detection tests 
 
Nucleic acid detection tests such as the PCR are gold standard methods for the detec-
tion of biological agents due to their high sensitivity and specificity (Grunow et al., 
2000, Hatchette et al., 2009, Mackay, 2004, Pohanka and Skladal, 2009). The PCR tech-
nique faithfully copies, or amplifies, a nucleic acid segment many thousands or millions 
of times which can then be detected by different means (Almassian et al., 2013). PCR 
relies on a thermal cycle program in which the target region is repeatedly denatured and 
copied by a thermostable polymerase guided by region-specific oligonucleotide primers.  
 
Real-time PCR is a new approach compared to standard PCR, where small aliquots of 
the amplified PCR product are transferred to agarose gels containing a fluorescent stain 
and allowed to migrate in an electric field (electrophoresis) prior to visualization with 
UV transillumination. In contrast, real-time PCR offers simultaneous amplification and 
quantification of a target nucleic acid region with a template-specific fluorescent probe 
added to the reaction buffer. Specific primers and a fluorescent probe reveal if the 
sample contains nucleic acid belonging to the target pathogen (Mackay, 2004). 
 
Primers containing sequences complementary to the target region along with a poly-
merase enzyme are the key components, which enable selective and repeated amplifica-
tion (Almassian et al., 2013). Primers are chemically synthesized oligonucleotides, with a 
length of about twenty nucleotides and are hybridized to target DNA, tens to hundreds 
of bases apart from each other.  
 
A probe, used in real-time PCR, is a short DNA fragment used to detect the presence 
of a complementary target. The probe thereby hybridizes to single-stranded DNA 
which is a perfect match (Almassian et al., 2013). Minor groove binding (MGB) probes 
consist of a fluorophore (“reporter”) covalently attached to the 5'-end and a “quench-
er” at the 3'-end. As long as the fluorophore and the quencher are in proximity, i.e., in 
the non-hybridized state, quenching inhibits any fluorescence (Figure 8). The benefit of 
MGB probes are their short length and specificity (Kutyavin et al., 2000).  
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Figure 8. Principle of real-time PCR. Reporter fluorophore and a quencher are attached to a 
probe (i.e., complementary sequence) to the target pathogen DNA marker. When the target 
DNA is amplified, the reporter fluorophore is separated from the quencher and can be detect-
ed by its fluorescence. 
 
A PCR mix consists of a polymerase, a buffer solution, specific primers and probe, de-
oxynucleotides, and a nucleic acid template from the sample under investigation. A 
RNA template has to be transcribed into complementary DNA (cDNA) with a reverse 
transcriptase prior to amplification (Almassian et al., 2013). 
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In addition to real-time PCR, other alternative nucleic acid detection tests have been 
developed. Isothermal amplification technology is also a sensitive and suitable method 
for portable gene amplification detection (Eboigbodin et al., 2016, Eboigbodin and 
Hoser, 2016). This novel technology performs amplification at a stable temperature as 
compared to conventional and real-time PCR. Thus, without thermal cycling, this tech-
nology needs less power, which represents a distinct advantage in the field (Almassian 
et al., 2013). Of gene-amplification methods used in the field, real-time PCR is the gold 
standard but isothermal amplification is a promising technology for the near future. 
Simple real-time interpretation of test results makes the technology a strong candidate 
for future point-of-care diagnostics, especially in situations where the user does not 
have special expertise. Commercially available nucleic acid detection tests usually in-
clude both pathogen-specific kits and the instrument (Eboigbodin et al., 2016). Some 
products also include an automated sample preparation method (Guenaoui et al., 2016, 
Hirvonen et al., 2015, Moussa et al., 2016, Zumla et al., 2014). 
 
2.9.2.1 Sample preparation methods 
 
Isolation of nucleic acid from biological samples is the first step prior to nucleic acid 
detection tests. Such methods perform optimally when purified DNA or RNA (i.e., free 
from potential amplification inhibitors) is used (Shaw et al., 2009). Clinical samples are 
inactivated and prepared for genetic amplification. Preparation includes nucleic acid 
extraction and purification from other material in the sample. During nucleic acid ex-
traction and purification, any infectious pathogens are inactivated. Extracted and puri-
fied nucleic acids are then used as template in gene amplification protocols. Both auto-
mated extraction instruments and manual extraction kits are widely available and used 
routinely in industrial, medical and academic settings (Dauphin et al., 2011, Ip et al., 
2015, Whitehouse and Hottel, 2007). 
 
2.9.3 Genetic characterization of pathogens 
 
Genetic characterization includes sequencing and bioinformatics and is an important 
part of detecting and identifying pathogens prior to mounting an appropriate response. 
Information concerning the genetic profile of a pathogen(s) can help to distinguish 
natural outbreaks from a deliberate release (Cheung and Kwan, 2012, Chin et al., 2011, 
Dembek et al., 2007, Koser et al., 2012). Genetic characterization helps trace the source 
of a pathogen and its transmission pathway by comparing the prevalent strain in the 
outbreak to those circulating in nearby populations. It also helps to investigate any ge-
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netic manipulation, mutations, geographic patterns, and in relation to known laboratory 
strains or unexpected antibiotic resistance (Sjodin et al., 2013). With genetic characteri-
zation, it is possible to quickly identify genome differences between closely related iso-
lates.  
 
Commercial high-throughput techniques based on Sanger sequencing (i.e., the use of 
fluorescent di-deoxynucleotide terminators) have been available for decades, but they 
have their limitations in the form of slow processing speeds, high cost and high de-
mand of operator skill (Mardis, 2008, Sanger et al., 1977, Torok and Peacock, 2012). 
Sanger sequencing is not easily adapted for processing large genomes or large numbers 
of samples, when at the same time recent developments of sequencing technologies 
have made it possible to rapidly sequence the entire genome of a pathogen (McGinn 
and Gut, 2013, Torok and Peacock, 2012).  
 
Nowadays, next generation sequencing (NGS) technologies in concert with genome 
sequence libraries available in public databases are capable of providing whole-genome 
sequence data (Vernikos et al., 2015). Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) is an emerging 
technology with considerable promise for diagnostic and public health microbiology 
(Torok and Peacock, 2012). WGS technologies have become more reliable and are be-
ing applied in clinical microbiology laboratories to detect and characterize pathogens 
(Bertelli and Greub, 2013, Quinones-Mateu et al., 2014, Van den Hoecke et al., 2015). 
Some NGS platforms such as the Illumina MiSeq and Life Technologies Ion Torrent 
can provide WGS data within 2–3 days of receiving a sample (Van den Hoecke et al., 
2015).  
 
Due to the recent developments in sequencing technology, genetic characterization 
methods are accessible and affordable (Quick et al., 2014).  Small size nanopore se-
quencing technology is a single-molecule detection system and operates by driving mol-
ecules electrophoretically in solution through a nano-scale pore (Branton et al., 2008). 
The technology has been used successfully to sequence the entire genome of some in-
fluenza A viruses (Wang et al., 2015) and has also been used in the field to sequence the 
ebola pathogen during a recent outbreak in West Africa (Gardy et al., 2015). This field-
ready technology reduces the need to ship biological samples to off-site diagnostic la-
boratories and thereby minimize response time.  
 
The challenge with whole-genome sequencing methods is the lack of high-quality refer-
ence databases containing pathogen genomes (Torok and Peacock, 2012). Furthermore, 
accessing and comparing an unknown sequence to an on-line database could prove 
challenging in a remote location with poor telecommunications coverage (Quick et al., 
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2014). Also, accuracy of the portable nanopore sequencing technology has recently 
been reported to be between 65 to 85 % per base (Kilianski et al., 2015)
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3. AIMS OF THE STUDY 
 
The aims of this study were to develop and test the performance of portable real-time 
PCR systems in the detection of pathogenic biological agents in the field, to further 
complement the workflow by characterization of the pathogen, and to present the criti-
cal factors in a successful investigation of biological agents in biothreat preparedness. 
 
The specific aims of this study were: 
 
? To test and compare the performance of commercially-available rapid nucleic 
acid extraction methods to be used in the field with portable thermocyclers. 
 
? To develop highly sensitive and rapid on-site methods for the detection of 
three high-risk biothreat bacterial pathogens (Francisella tularensis, Bacillus an-
thracis and Yersinia pestis) under field conditions. 
 
? To develop a method that detects all subtypes of influenza A virus and a 
method for the specific detection of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus with rap-
id identification technology in the field.  
 
? To genetically characterize adenovirus serotypes circulating in conscripts of 
the Finnish Defence Forces in order to gain detailed genetic characteristics of 
the virus. Sequence data of a biothreat pathogen can reveal possible deliberate 
release.  
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4. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This section briefly describes the materials and methods used in this study. More de-
tailed descriptions can be found in the original publications, which are referred to here 
by the Roman numerals I-IV. 
 
4.1 Materials 
4.1.1 Bacterial and tissue samples (I, II) 
 
Bacterial control samples for specificity testing of real-time PCR assays were received 
from the bacterial collection of the Centre for Biological Threat Preparedness laborato-
ries (I, II). Specificity testing was done with 24 bacterial strains (II) (Table 6). In addi-
tion, 1035 vole liver tissue samples were received from the Finnish Forest Research 
Institute (nowadays the Natural Resources Institute of Finland) collected at the Su-
onenjoki Research Station of the Finnish Forest Research Institute and at the Kilpisjär-
vi Biological Station of the University of Helsinki (II). 
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Table 6. Specificity of the bacterial assays was tested with DNA of 24 bacterial strains. 
Bacterial strains used for real-time PCR speci-
ficity testing 
Agrobacterium tumefaciens C58C1/RP4 
B. anthracis ATCC 4229 (pXO1-/pXO2+) 
B. anthracis Sterne 7702 (pXO1+/pXO2-) 
B. cereus ELMI 21  
B. licheniformis ELMI 325  
B. mycoides ELMI 44 
B. thuringiensis ELMI 123  
B. thuringiensis subsp. kurstaki-aizaway
Brucella melitensis 72 
Enterobacter cloacae tks461  
Escheria coli C600/pYET6  
F. tularensis LVS (ATCC 29684) 
Moraxella catarrhalis 035E  
Staphylococcus aureus ATCC 25923 
Y. bercovieri 3016/84
Y. enterocolitica 1309/80 
Y. intermedia 9/85 
Y. kristensenii 119/84
Y. mollaretii 92/84 
Y. pestis EV76-c 
Y. pestis KIM D1 
Y. pseudotuberculosis H305-36/89 
Y. pseudotuberculosis No.90 
Y. ruckeri RS41 
 
4.1.2 Viral samples (III, IV) 
 
Nasopharyngeal aspirates or combined flocked nasal and throat swab samples were 
collected by medical personnel from military conscripts with acute respiratory infec-
tions. These specimens were intended for sentinel surveillance of respiratory infections 
conducted by the Institute of National Health and Welfare (THL) from 24 military gar-
risons and border guard detachment units (III, IV) (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9. Respiratory samples were collected from army 
recruits or staff of 24 military garrisons or Finnish board-
er guard departments (*). 
 
Nucleic acids isolated from influenza A viruses, adenoviruses and from other common 
respiratory viruses (i.e., influenza B, influenza C, parainfluenza virus types 1, 2, and 3, 
human respiratory syncytial virus, human bocavirus and human metapneumovirus) 
from the virus collection of the THL virus laboratories were used in sensitivity and 
specificity testing of the real-time PCR methods (III). The specificity of the assays was 
tested with RNA from 18 influenza A viruses, as well as with nine other common res-
piratory viruses (III) (Table 7). In addition, RNA from 125 influenza A samples (III) 
and DNA from 837 adenovirus samples (IV) were analyzed. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. *Bgd of South East Finland
2. *Bgd of Lapland 
3. *Bgd of North Karelia 
4. Dragsvik
5. Halli
6. Hamina
7. Kajaani
8. Keuruu
9. Kauhava
10. Kontiolahti 
11. Lahti
12. Lappeenranta 
13. Luonetjärvi 
14. Niinisalo 
15. Parola
16. Riihimäki 
17. Rissala
18. Rovaniemi 
19. Santahamina 
20. Sodankylä 
21. Säkylä
22. Upinniemi 
23. Utti
24. Vekaranjärvi 
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Table 7. Specificity of the influenza A assays was tested with nucleic acid of 27 viral strains. 
Virus strains used for real-time PCR specifici-
ty testing 
  
Influenza A, A/Panama/2007/99 (H3N2) 
Influenza A, A/Fin/81/08 (H3N2) 
Influenza A, A/Fin/149/08 (H3N2) 
Influenza A, A/Fin/209/08 (H1N1) 
Influenza A, A/Fin/213/08 (H1N1) 
Influenza A, A/Mallard/Neth/12/00 (H7N3)  
Influenza A, A/HK/1073/99 (H9N2) 
Influenza A H5N1 Clade 1  
Influenza A H5N1 Clade 2.1  
Influenza A H5N1 Clade 2.2  
Influenza A H5N1 Clade 2.3.2  
Influenza A H5N1 Clade 2.3.4  
Influenza A, A/Fin/544/09 (H1N1)pdm09 
Influenza A, A/Fin/571/09 (H1N1)pdm09 
Influenza A, A/Fin/577/09 (H1N1)pdm09  
Influenza A, A/Fin/579/09 (H1N1)pdm09 
Influenza A, A/Fin/582/09 (H1N1)pdm09 
Influenza A, A/Fin/554/09 (H1N1)pdm09 
Influenza B  
Influenza C, C/Ann Arbor/1/50
Parainfluenza virus 1  
Parainfluenza virus 2  
Parainfluenza virus 3  
Respiratory syncytial virus 
Bocavirus  
Human metapneumovirus  
Adenovirus (type 7) 
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4.2 Methods 
 
4.2.1 Sample preparation methods (I, II, III) 
 
Sample preparation methods (e.g., nucleic acid extraction) to be used in field for bacte-
rial and viral samples were tested and compared on the basis of their performance and 
features of the extraction kits (I–III).  
 
Commercial DNA extraction kits were compared and also evaluated for their ability to 
inactivate Bacillus thuringiensis spores and to extract spore DNA from spiked powder 
samples (icing sugar and potato flour) (I). The kits employed different techniques, in-
cluding heat treatment, spin column procedures, bead beating, and magnetic beads (Ta-
ble 8). 
 
Table 8. Commercially-available DNA extraction kits evaluated in this study.  
 
The performance of the kits was evaluated based on the processing time, DNA recov-
ery and purity, the need for additional laboratory equipment (i.e., heat block, vortex 
disruptor), the elimination of potential PCR inhibitors, and the sensitivity of the subse-
quent real-time PCR analysis (I). Also centrifugal filter units (Merck Millipore Ultrafree-
MC Centrifugal Filter Devices) were tested for the additional removal of spores from 
DNA samples. Extracted DNA was analyzed with a real-time PCR assay optimized for 
B. thuringiensis (I).  
 
To demonstrate the field capability and point-of-care suitability, nucleic acid extractions 
were also performed in field conditions (II, III). DNA from 1035 rodent samples was 
extracted and analyzed at the biological research stations in Kilpisjärvi and Suonenjoki 
in conditions outside a sophisticated laboratory (II) and RNA from 21 clinical samples 
DNA extraction kit 
 QIAamp DNA 
Mini Kit 
RTP Pathogen 
Kit 
ZR Fungal / 
Bacterial DNA 
MiniPrep 
genesig Easy 
DNA/RNA Ex-
traction kit 
Method Spin column Spin column Spin column Magnetic beads 
Equipment Heat blocks Heat block, ther-
momixer 
- Magnetic rack 
Lysis method Heat treatment Heat treatment Lysis solution and 
bead beating 
Lysis buffer 
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was extracted at a healthcare center of a military garrison (III). All nucleic acid extrac-
tions were performed according to the manufacturer’s instructions (I–III). 
 
4.2.2 Biosafety in sample preparation (I, II, III) 
 
All pathogenic biological samples must be inactivated by chemical or physical means 
prior to analysis in order to protect laboratory personnel from infection (Blow et al., 
2004), (Dauphin et al., 2009). For example, bacterial spores are highly resilient and may 
remain viable following standard inactivation protocols (I). Nucleic acid extracts should 
be non-infectious but given their pathogenic origin, appropriate personal protective 
equipment (PPE) was used throughout the study (Daugherty et al., 2010). In addition 
to carefully selected nucleic acid extraction methods (I–III), PPE was selected accord-
ing to the pathogenic risk assessment protocol (i.e., coverall suit, goggles and FFP-3 
facemask, gloves and boots) (Grolla et al., 2011, Daugherty et al., 2010). The use of 
PPE is emphasized according to the risk group of the pathogen.  
 
4.2.3 Real-time PCR assay design and optimization (I, II, III, IV) 
 
Nucleic acid samples of the pathogens were amplified and identified with specific pri-
mers and probes using portable real-time thermocyclers (II, III). In addition to Taqman 
probe-based chemistry, SYBR-green chemistry was used for the identification of ade-
novirus serotypes (IV). 
A novel real-time PCR assay for the detection of F. tularensis was developed (II). The 
assay target was the insertion sequence element ISFtu2, which is well represented in the 
F. tularensis genome. Other oligonucleotides used in this study have been reported pre-
viously (I–IV), and combinations were based on sequences available in the NCBI data-
base. The ISFtu2 assay was developed using the Primer Express software, version 2.0 
(Life Technologies Ltd, Carlsbad, CA, USA) (II) and the oligonucleotide concentrations 
for real-time PCR were optimized (II). Furthermore, commercial real-time PCR kits 
were evaluated for field use. The final kit selection was based on performance and fea-
tures, e.g., highest sensitivity based on threshold cycle (Ct) values and fluorescence lev-
els (II, III).  
 
4.2.4 Sensitivity and specificity testing of the real-time PCR assays (II, III) 
 
Sensitivity and specificity of the real-time PCR assays were tested in a reference labora-
tory (THL) both with portable thermocyclers and with gold standard real-time PCR 
equipment Applied Biosystems (ABI) 7300, and results were compared (II, III).  Sensi-
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tivity of the real-time PCR assays was tested using serial ten-fold dilutions of nucleic 
acid extracted from bacterial (II) and viral (III) strains. The specificity of the bacterial 
assays was evaluated with DNA extracted from clinical and environmental bacterial 
samples (II), and the specificity of the viral assays was tested with RNA extracted from 
influenza A viruses and nine other common respiratory viruses (III). Real-time PCR 
assays were performed in duplicate as part of a dilution series and each reaction was 
carried out with optimized oligonucleotide concentrations (II, III).  
 
4.2.5 Controls in DNA amplification (I, II, III, IV) 
 
Each PCR assay included a negative (i.e., no template) control (NTC) and a positive 
nucleic acid control (I, II, III, IV). An internal positive control (IPC) was used in the 
confirmation assay performed on the ABI 7300 (III). IPC in DNA amplification is used 
to monitor the performance of real-time PCR. The IPC ensures that a failed real-time 
PCR is not mistaken for a negative test result. The IPC distinguishes between two types 
of negative reactions; samples identified as negative because (1) they lack the target se-
quence or (2) due to the presence of PCR inhibitors. PCR inhibitors can originate from 
the sample itself or may be introduced during sample processing or nucleic acid extrac-
tion, usually causing decreased sensitivity or false negatives.  PCR inhibitors can be pre-
sent in different types of matrices, such as clinical, food or environmental specimens 
(Schrader et al., 2012). An IPC mixture consists of a specific IPC template as well as 
specific primers and a probe, which is labeled with a different fluorophore (e.g., VIC) 
than the probe specific to the sample DNA (e.g., FAM). Different fluorophores enable 
simultaneous detection of both target DNA and IPC DNA. Failed IPC amplification 
usually reflects the presence of PCR inhibitors.  
 
4.2.6 Carrying out a real-time PCR analysis in field (II, III) 
 
Portable real-time PCR thermocyclers and pathogen-specific assays were used to de-
termine if pathogenic agents could be rapidly and reliably diagnosed in the field (II, III). 
Size, weight and robustness of thermal cyclers are important technical issues for the 
development of real-time PCR methods for use outside of the laboratory (Ivnitski et al., 
2003). The PikoReal Real-Time PCR System (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA) 
weighs 10 kg (II) and RAZOR EX Instrument (BioFire Defense, Salt Lake City, UT) 
4.9 kg (III), and both instruments are comprised of robust technology suitable for use 
in the field. With both real-time PCR instruments, nucleic acid amplification occurs in a 
closed reaction plate (II) or a pouch (III) and this separates the amplified product from 
the hardware and the environment, thus limiting the risk of contamination of amplified 
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DNA fragments which may lead to false positives. The PikoReal cycler was packed into 
a compact shock- and water-resistant Pelican case (Pelican Products Inc., Torrance, 
CA) together with a laptop computer with PikoReal software and conductor rails for a 
power supply (Figure 10). The DNA extraction equipment was transported in a sepa-
rate case (Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 10. The PikoReal technology equipment was packed into a compact Pelican box with all 
necessary hardware. 
 
 40
 
??????????????????
 
  
 
Figure 11. The DNA extraction equipment was packed in a separate case. 
 
To prevent contamination, different solutions (i.e., mechanical and chemical barriers) 
can be used (Aslanzadeh, 2004). In this study, all field diagnostic stages (Table 9) were 
done in separate spaces and a set of positive, non-template and extraction controls was 
used with each assay (II, III). This protocol was implemented both in biological re-
search stations (II) and healthcare centers of military garrisons (III). 
 
Table 9. To avoid contamination, all field test processes should be done in separate spaces. 
Field diagnostics stages 
1. Sampling 
2. Nucleic acid extraction 
3. Preparation of qPCR master mix
4. Adding of template 
5. Amplification and detection of nucleic acid and interpretation of results 
 
Real-time PCR contamination is the accidental introduction of "foreign" material, e.g., 
amplified DNA or laboratory personnel DNA, and can significantly distort results. The 
risk of contamination is high under field conditions due to nature of working spaces 
and ability to maintain an appropriate level of hygiene for each of the different stages 
(Hedman et al., 2013, Aslanzadeh, 2004). Contamination can occur at each stage of a 
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real-time PCR analysis, even in sample collection. Positive control material and real-
time PCR products already present in the laboratory are the most common sources of 
contamination. The quantity of amplified nucleic acid after real-time PCR is enormous 
compared to the starting material. Therefore, tubes or plates containing real-time PCR 
products were never opened following amplification. The advantage of real-time PCR, 
compared to conventional PCR, is that amplification and quantification occur simulta-
neously, removing the need to expose PCR product to the workspace.  
 
4.2.7 Genetic characterization of adenoviruses by sequence analysis (IV) 
 
During five years from 2008 to 2012, 3577 respiratory specimens were collected from 
Finnish military conscripts presenting symptoms compatible with acute respiratory tract 
infection. A total of 794 of these specimens were identified as adenovirus-positive and 
were available for genotype identification (IV). For 672 of these specimens, the sero-
types were successfully determined by DNA sequencing. Twelve samples which gave 
inconclusive results from direct sequencing of the amplicon were further analyzed by 
cloning. PCR amplicons were cloned using the TOPO TA cloning kit according to the 
manufacturer’s instructions and subsequently amplified in Escherichia coli (Invitrogen 
Corporation, Carlsbad, CA, USA). Amplicons and cloning products were sequenced by 
the Finnish Institute for Molecular Medicine (Helsinki, Finland) and nucleotide se-
quences were further analyzed with the Sequencer 5.1 program (Gene Codes Corpora-
tion, Ann Arbor, MI USA). The BLAST search tool and ClustalW were used to com-
pare amplicon sequences to reference sequences published in GenBank (IV). 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Evaluation of nucleic acid extraction methods in the field (I, II, III) 
 
The selected extraction kits relied on different protocols and techniques, including heat 
treatment, spin column filtration, bead beating, and magnetic beads. These translated to 
differences in processing time and performance (I–III), i.e., sensitivity differences of 
the real-time PCR (I). The Ct values varied from 18.4 to 19.4. The limit of detection of 
the extracted Bacillus thuringiensis DNA varied from 3 x 101 to 3 x 103 colony-forming 
units (CFU) and reflected DNA yields (Table 10) (I). The extraction time used for nine 
samples varied from 65 to 155 min (Table 10) (I). Overall, the manual extraction kits 
gave consistent results in real-time PCR. The differences in cost per sample between 
the kits tested did not correlate with the overall performance (I). Also, centrifugal filter 
units removed spores from DNA extracts (bacterial spore positive) and from control 
samples known to contain bacterial spores. Thus, this additional step is worthwhile in 
field situations where it is of utmost importance that samples are spore-free (Table 10) 
(I). 
 
Table 10. Performance indicators were established with commercial extraction kits. 
                      DNA extraction kit 
E
xt
ra
ct
io
n
 k
it
s 
  
QIAamp 
DNA Mini 
Kit 
RTP Pathogen 
Kit 
ZR Fungal / 
Bacterial 
DNA Mini-
Prep 
genesig Easy 
DNA/RNA 
Extraction kit
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 in
d
ic
at
or
s Spore inactivation Yes Yes Yes No* 
Processing time 155 min 100 min 65 min 105 min 
DNA yield 34 ng/μl 78 ng/μl6 17 ng/μl 41 ng/μl 
DNA purity 
(A260/A280) 
1.8 2.5 1.5 1.4 
Ct value 18.4 18.7 19.0 19.4 
Limit of detection 3 x 101 CFU 3 x 101 CFU 3 x 103 CFU 3 x 101 CFU 
    
*Centrifugal filter units removed the spores both from extracted DNA samples and from bacterial 
spore positive control samples. 
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The extraction methods used in the field were rapid and results obtained were reliable 
and comparable to those achieved in the reference laboratory (II, III). Some differences 
in DNA purity and yield were seen but the performance level of all extraction kits test-
ed was considered suitable for field use (I–III). Furthermore, no contaminations were 
experienced in the field, even though conditions were suboptimal, i.e., working condi-
tions were not validated compared to those in the reference laboratory (II, III). Extrac-
tion protocols were not performed in a portable glove box, which would represent an 
additional level of biosafety precaution. Commercially-available glove boxes designed 
for field-use are readily available (Grolla et al., 2012, Panning et al., 2007, Wolfel et al., 
2015), and this or a small plastic tent could be used with positive controls to minimize 
the risk of cross contamination. 
 
Sampling and pre-test sample handling are laborious and time-consuming steps in 
pathogen identification. Easy-to-use nucleic acid extraction methods are needed for 
point-of-care diagnosis and for inactivation of pathogenic agents in biothreat prepared-
ness and response protocols. For this study, sample extraction steps were optimized 
according to preliminary testing and prior experience of their use e.g., storage capabili-
ties, extraction time and usability of the kits in the field (II, III).  The reagents of the 
nucleic acid extraction kits did not require a freezer or cold storage (cold chain), and it 
is therefore possible to store and use the kit at room temperature and in the field (I–
III). Reagent stability and optimized protocols enable fast isolation of nucleic acids in 
the field (I–III).  
 
In addition to manual kits intended for a small number of samples, automated extrac-
tion systems are also available for the rapid processing of large number of samples 
(Dauphin et al., 2011). However, limitations of the field dictate that a portable, low-
volume and versatile method is preferable (I) and, compared to manual kits, the equip-
ment necessary for automated extraction is more expensive to purchase, maintain and 
operate, requires a continuous and reliable power source, and contamination issues are 
more difficult to resolve. Thus, small systems that can be powered from portable pow-
er-supplies have clear advantages in field situations. 
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5.2 Analysis of the real-time PCR and genetic characterization results (I, II, 
III, IV) 
 
5.2.1 Analysis of the real-time PCR results  
 
The performance of newly-developed portable real-time PCR thermocyclers (PikoReal 
and RAZOR EX) was compared to a standard real-time PCR thermocycler, (ABI 
7300). The PikoReal was tested for the detection of three high-risk biothreat bacterial 
pathogens (Francisella tularensis, Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis) and the RAZOR EX 
for rapid on-site diagnostics and for reliable identification of influenza A virus. Perfor-
mance of the assay was the same with all instruments, suggesting a robust technology 
that can be successfully applied in the field (II, III). 
 
Sensitivity of the biothreat bacterial assays (F. tularensis, B.anthracis and Y.pestis) ranged 
from 1 to 100 fg of DNA, and no cross-reactivity was seen between species-specific 
assays nor with DNA extracted from 24 other bacterial species used as templates (II). 
 
When analyzing 1035 rodent samples at the research stations in Suonenjoki and Kilpis-
järvi, real-time PCR results using the PikoReal instrument were achieved in approxi-
mately 1.5 hours. Pre-PCR preparations including DNA extraction required approxi-
mately 45 min. Results from the field (i.e., screening for F. tularensis at the research sta-
tions with the PikoReal) agreed with the results obtained using both ABI 7300 and Pi-
koReal real-time PCR instruments in the reference laboratory at THL (II).  
 
Detection limits of the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 assay and the influenza A type-
specific assay were 8.8 PFU (plaque forming units) of cultured A/Finland/554/09 virus 
and 0.15 PFU of cultured A/Panama/2008/99 (H3N2) virus, respectively. The speci-
ficity of the assays was tested with RNA from 18 influenza A viral strains, as well as 
with nine other common respiratory viruses (III). With respect to the broad-reacting 
influenza A assay, all subtypes tested gave a positive signal while none of the other res-
piratory viruses in the control panel were amplified. With respect to the influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09-specific assay, all pandemic influenza strains were positive and no 
cross-reactivity was seen with other influenza A or other respiratory viral strains. 
 
Furthermore, 104 combined nasal and throat samples collected from military recruits 
presenting with symptoms of febrile upper respiratory tract infection during the pan-
demic wave in the autumn of 2009 were analyzed. Of these, 65 were influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 positive and 39 negative using both influenza A assays. No difference 
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in sensitivity or specificity between the ABI 7300 and the RAZOR EX technologies 
was observed. 
 
To demonstrate point-of-care suitability of the RAZOR EX technology, 21 clinical 
samples were tested under field conditions at a healthcare center in a military garrison. 
Reliable results were obtained in 1.5 hours. Real-time PCR results with the RAZOR EX 
were obtained within 45 min and an additional 45 min were required for the RNA ex-
traction. 
 
Sensitivity and specificity of the assays, as well as size and weight of the equipment are 
important factors to be taken into account when developing real-time detection solu-
tions for field use. The real-time PCR performance achieved in the field did not differ 
from that in the diagnostic laboratory (II, III). PCR can be sensitive to inhibitors and 
contaminations. To avoid contaminations, all field diagnostic stages were performed in 
separate spaces. To monitor possible contaminations, a set of positive, non-template 
and extraction controls were included in each assay (II, III). Furthermore, with the con-
firmatory instrument platform (ABI 7300), an internal positive control (IPC) was used 
(III). No contamination or PCR inhibition was observed during the study.  
 
Technical limitations often restrict the use of sensitive and reliable diagnostics outside 
of sophisticated laboratories. Standard real-time PCR instruments, such as ABI 7300 
are often large and heavy (29 kg) and include technology such as a tungsten-halogen 
lamp which is unsuitable for field use (III). Portable thermocyclers used in this study, 
the PikoReal and the RAZOR EX were light and small, (10 kg and 4.9 kg, respectively) 
and employed field-suitable and robust technology. 
 
5.2.2 Evaluation of the portable real-time PCR technology in field use 
 
Rapid and accurate detection and identification of infectious agents is essential in the 
response to disease outbreaks and biothreats. Diagnostic analyses with portable real-
time PCR systems proved to be simple and rapid, as reliable results were achieved in 
field trials in approximately 90–120 minutes from the beginning of sample preparation 
to the completion of the real-time PCR (II, III). These results demonstrate that these 
instruments combined with pathogen-specific assays perform as well in field conditions 
as they do in sophisticated laboratories. The technology used in this study provides 
high sensitivity combined with speed and can be performed near the patient (III) and in 
the field (II). Sample preparation is a time-consuming step of pathogen identification (I, 
II, III) but with field equipment the time from sampling to obtaining a result is mini-
mized because the molecular diagnostic protocols can be completed on-site.  
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The portable methodologies tested are reliable, robust, and suitable for use in pathogen 
surveillance. Portable real-time PCR instruments have been described earlier (Arif et al., 
2013, Koskela et al., 2009, Matero et al., 2011, Paixão et al., 2008, Pierce et al., 2010), 
but compared to these techniques the latest commercially-available instruments provide 
technical advances by facilitating multiplexing, and modules for absolute and relative 
quantification as well as melting curve analysis. These advances enhance the capabilities 
of the equipment for research purposes (III).  
 
The portable nucleic acid amplification technology evaluated in this study presents a 
strong candidate for portable and rapid diagnostics, such as identification of respiratory 
disease-causing agents in healthcare centers, in military garrisons or of biothreat agents 
in crisis management operations. If the diagnostic technology is in routine use on a reg-
ular basis or during epidemics in military garrisons, the technology and protocols will 
be effectively used in crisis situations. 
 
The technology could be developed further by reducing power demand to the point 
that it could be met with a high-capacity battery and without the need for a separate 
laptop computer. This would reduce the size and weight of the equipment and form the 
basis of a backpack laboratory. Also, easy-to-use features like simplified interpretation 
of the results and wireless data transfer would streamline information sharing with deci-
sion makers. Lyophilized or otherwise stabilized real-time PCR reagents and assay kits 
stored at room temperature would enhance field utility of the system.  
A prototype product of lyophilized reagents which includes a lyophilized master mix, 
an internal positive control, influenza A -specific oligonucleotides (Molsa et al., 2012), 
and an external positive influenza A-specific control was developed and tested in the 
course of this study. The performance of liquid and lyophilized reagents was evaluated 
in relation to assay sensitivity with the PikoReal and the ABI 7300 real-time PCR in-
struments. The PikoReal platform exhibited similar assay sensitivity as the ABI 7300. In 
addition, our results showed that the sensitivity of the assays was similar both with liq-
uid and lyophilized reagents when using the PikoReal system. Furthermore, shelf life of 
lyophilized reagents was tested at RT and -20? C (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Lyophilized real-time PCR reagents stable at room temperature (RT) enhance the 
field utility of this system. Sensitivity of the lyophilized reagents, stored at RT or -20? C, were 
tested with real-time PCR during a period of twelve months. Lyophilized reagents were stable 
for three months in RT. 
 
These results demonstrate the potential feasibility of a portable thermocycler and ly-
ophilized reagents intended for rapid near-patient diagnosis of influenza A virus (M 
Mölsä et al. unpublished results). Assay development for other pathogens with lyophi-
lized oligonucleotides as well as with lyophilized external and internal controls is in 
progress.  
 
In addition to field diagnostics in this study (II, III), the portable diagnostic tool has 
been applied to be used in a crisis management operation of the Finnish Defence Forc-
es (Figure 13). It has also been used under field conditions in Tanzania in the Strengthen-
ing Health and Biosecurity in Tanzania by the Biodetection Capacity Building project as a part of 
Finland´s contribution to the Global Health Security Agenda (Figure 14). These studies 
and the development of the diagnostic tool directly support Finland’s commitment to 
the Biological Weapons Convention. Field diagnostic studies in Tanzania have shown 
that, in addition to limited and compromised workspace, high temperatures, humid 
conditions and the risk of contamination, as well as fluctuation in the electricity supply 
represent the main challenges to overcome in field conditions. This could be solved by 
using an uninterrupted power supply or a portable generator to drive those diagnostic 
instruments that are not battery powered (Inglis, 2013). 
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Figure 13. The portable thermocyclers were packed in a waterproof box with all necessary 
equipment to be used in an international crisis management operation. 
 
 
Figure 14. The portable thermocyclers were set up for field use related to the project Strengthen-
ing Health and Biosecurity in Tanzania by Biodetection Capacity Building. 
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The possibility to develop and use in-house and other previously optimized assays in 
the field is considered an advantage. There are some commercial automated biodetec-
tion systems available, but these often work as closed systems, as they usually operate 
with commercial assay kits, and thus using optimized in-house assays is seldom possi-
ble. Also, access to the raw data, such as amplification curves and Ct values is often 
limited. This may, especially in cases of weak positive results, complicate decision-
making and lengthen the response time unnecessarily. However, standardization and 
automation are important features which can enhance detection capabilities and reduce 
costs. They may also reduce detection error rates and improve the quality and reliability 
of diagnostic results. It is unlikely that automated systems of the near future will replace 
the need for confirmatory analyses provided by reference laboratories. Reference labor-
atories and in-field diagnostic capabilities complement each other and should not be 
considered separate entities. 
 
The field-ready protocol presented here can be used to detect deliberately-released bio-
logical agents and is now applied in the mobile CBRN laboratory of the Finnish De-
fence Forces. Mobile field laboratories can help optimize field investigation work by 
applying a sampling strategy and specialized personnel to locations identified by the 
CBRN reconnaissance team. Diagnostic work can also be carried out in the field by 
CBRN reconnaissance or SIBCRA teams. Mobile laboratories can screen samples in the 
field with portable real-time PCR technology to reduce the number of samples to be 
sent to the reference laboratories for detailed analysis. Mobile laboratories are useful 
assets when collecting samples from or near the investigation site. The utility of mobile 
laboratories is recognized globally and was demonstrated by the World Health Organi-
zation’s response to the latest Ebola outbreaks by teams of the ´European Mobile Lab´ 
in West Africa (Wolfel et al., 2015). 
 
5.2.3 Genetic characterization of adenoviruses among Finnish Military Con-
scripts  
 
One of the key challenges in investigating alleged use of biological weapons is the abil-
ity to differentiate intentional from naturally-occurring biological events, of which the 
former is identified for example by geographical occurrence of the pathogen or the 
presence of an atypical or genetically-engineered strain (Sjodin et al., 2013). Thus, there 
is a need for a scientific assessment of whether an outbreak is natural or deliberately 
caused by a hostile party (Sjodin et al., 2013). Molecular characterization of a pathogen 
is an important part of a strong response to biological threats as the origin(s) of the 
outbreak can be identified and an appropriate course of action followed. Genetic se-
quencing has been a reliable and robust method for over three decades (McGinn and 
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Gut, 2013) and amplicon sequencing has been presented as a viable approach for path-
ogen detection and characterization (Zumla et al., 2014). Nucleic acid sequencing has 
commonly been used for the identification of isolates and for their classification into 
genotypes that can be associated with host species or geographical regions (Gardy et al., 
2015). 
 
Respiratory infections, including adenovirus-associated acute respiratory illnesses are 
common among military recruits (Gray et al., 2000, Sanchez et al., 2001, Top, 1975). In 
this study, 672 specimens collected over a five-year period from 2008 to 2012 and iden-
tified as adenovirus-positive by real-time PCR were sero-typed by DNA sequencing to 
circulating in Finnish military garrisons (IV). Results suggested that major outbreaks 
during 2008–2012 were caused by adenovirus type 3 and type 4 (Figure 15), with one of 
the types dominating during each outbreak (Figure 16) (IV). 
 
The serotype of 122 samples of the collected 794 adenovirus PCR-positive samples 
could not be determined with sequencing, possibly due to very low amount of viral 
DNA in the clinical sample. Most of the undetermined samples (27.8 %) and (21.1 %) 
were collected during 2011 and 2012, respectively. During these years samples were 
found to be PCR positive on initial testing with a probe-based real-time PCR, which 
yielded lower Ct-values than the SYBR Green assay, i.e., reflecting higher assay sensitiv-
ity. In this study, a SYBR Green-based PCR assay was used, as a probe assay may inter-
fere with the sequencing of the PCR product. 
 
Figure 15. Adenovirus serotypes (Ad) 3 and 4 clearly dominated in adenovirus outbreaks in 
Finnish Military Garrisons during 2008–2012. 
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Figure 16. Either adenovirus serotypes (Ad) 3 or 4 were dominant in each outbreak during 
2008–2012.  
 
Both of the dominant adenovirus types (3 and 4) have caused large outbreaks and have 
been responsible for acute respiratory disease among military conscripts elsewhere (Ko-
lavic-Gray et al., 2002, Kunz and Ottolini, 2010, McNeill et al., 2000, Top, 1975). A live 
oral vaccine against adenovirus types 4 and 7 was in use in the 1970s in US armed forc-
es and was shown to reduce febrile respiratory illnesses in vaccinated recruits (Russell et 
al., 2006). After vaccine production was discontinued in 1996, a resurgence of adenovi-
rus-induced respiratory illnesses among military recruits was noted (Kolavic-Gray et al., 
2002, Russell et al., 2006). A new oral vaccine against adenovirus types 4 and 7 was ap-
proved in 2011 and the adenovirus vaccination program for military recruits resumed 
(Hoke and Snyder, 2013, Potter et al., 2012, Radin et al., 2014). Reintroduction of the 
adenovirus vaccination program in 2011 has resulted in a dramatic decline in infection 
and detection rates among recruits (Hoke et al., 2012, Radin et al., 2014). However, 
Gray et al. (2000) and Russel et al. (2006) suggested that during the years when infec-
tions by adenovirus types 4 and 7 were controlled by vaccination (1971–1996), adenovi-
rus type 21 became the dominant strain causing infections. The information presented 
in this study may serve to help decide whether or not such a vaccine is likely to reduce 
adenovirus morbidity in the Finnish Armed Forces. It would, however, require contin-
ued monitoring to determine the extent to which other serotypes would replace adeno-
virus 4 should a conscript vaccination program be initiated. 
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5.2.3.1 Potential applications of portable genetic characterization methods 
 
Identification and characterization of pathogens in clinical, veterinary, or environmental 
samples can help to clarify the origin and transmission pathway of a pathogen and pro-
vide information for dispersal modeling and epidemiology. Genetic characterization 
makes it possible to detect cases of genetic manipulation, mutation, geographic pat-
terns, antibiotic resistance, unexpected infection source or virulence as well as match it 
to known laboratory strains that may have been adopted by weapons programs (Sjodin 
et al., 2013). The rapid availability of outbreak data also helps to direct epidemiological 
investigations (Dembek et al., 2007, Quick et al., 2014) and the development of rapid 
genome sequencing technology will soon provide this information in powerful detail 
(Quick et al., 2014). Novel nanopore technology shows potential for development of a 
miniature sequencer (Madoui et al., 2015, Quick et al., 2014), although the error rate 
must be improved before this technology can be considered reliable (Kilianski et al., 
2015). Novel sequencing technology can provide new opportunities in infectious dis-
ease diagnostics, such as rapid sequencing in response to the early phase of a viral epi-
demic or the determination of viral genotypes during an unexpected outbreak in a re-
mote location (Wang et al., 2015). Field-ready sequencing technology could be used as 
part of a real-time response to infectious diseases outbreaks, as the necessary equip-
ment is highly portable and the protocols are simple, rapid and robust (Kilianski et al., 
2015). Furthermore, real-time data of an outbreak could reveal key indicators of an 
emerging epidemic (Gardy et al., 2015, Quick et al., 2014). 
 
Accuracy of genotyping improves as more sequencing data are made available and a 
consensus sequence is formed. Furthermore, data can be shared through on-line 
“cloud” servers (den Bakker et al., 2014, Gardy et al., 2015, Quick et al., 2014). Portable 
near-future sequencing instruments will be at low cost to use and thus make it possible 
to deploy these instruments widely (Wang et al., 2015). The diagnostic tools used today 
to detect pathogens are developing towards portable sequencing platforms and bioin-
formatic methods by which one can identify and characterize any pathogen rapidly and 
reliably.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
 
In this project, the aim was to investigate whether rapid and reliable diagnosis of path-
ogenic agents with portable thermocyclers and pathogen-specific assays is realistic in 
biothreat preparedness and response.  
 
The key findings were that modern technology combined with in-house pathogen-
specific assays can yield DNA amplification data of a similar quality in field or laborato-
ry situations. Sample preparation and pathogen identification methods used in this 
study proved to be rapid and reliable when performed in field conditions. Available 
hardware and optimized protocols can satisfy all the main tasks of the Finnish Defence 
Forces, namely military defense of Finland, support other domestic authorities, and to 
participate in international crisis management. Rapid diagnostics can be used to assist 
decision making in outbreak investigations (Figure 17). 
 
 
Figure 17. Rapid sample preparation and detection of a pathogen will hasten and improve de-
cision making in outbreak situations or when investigating alleged deliberate release of biologi-
cal agent. 
 
Reduction in size and weight of near-future equipment for molecular detection of 
pathogens will help develop lab-in-a-box systems to a backpack laboratory (Inglis, 
2013). Furthermore, increasingly user-friendly operating systems will reduce the need 
for highly trained personnel to safely obtain diagnostic data at short notice (Zumla et 
al., 2014). 
 
The boundary between laboratory and field analysis is blurring as novel detection and 
sequencing technologies are developing and becoming more suitable for use outside the 
laboratory (Bertelli and Greub, 2013). Discrimination between deliberate release of a 
biological agent and its natural cycle requires detailed characterization of the agent. 
With accurate technology and a complete knowledge-base, a modular field laboratory 
can provide advanced technical support in resource-limited and remote locations where 
clinical laboratories are unavailable (Inglis, 2013). The present study provides methods 
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that can be used in a field laboratory to be deployed at short notice. This system pro-
vides authorities with a rapid-response capability to biothreats. A robust and accounta-
ble protocol provides excellent documentation for decision-makers and agencies wish-
ing to pursue legal action with respect to any wrongdoing. The ability to inform public 
health decision makers with rapid diagnostics has proven useful elsewhere (Inglis et al., 
2011). 
 
This study has identified several issues that require additional work. First, there is a 
need to define what “identification” actually means in the context of a biological weap-
on investigation, and the interpretation of results must be very carefully defined (II, III, 
IV). Key factors will be precise and robust procedures that must be followed in any 
protocol, and certification and accreditation processes must focus on general perfor-
mance (Bonini et al., 2002). 
 
Another important issue in biological threat preparedness is the systematic risk assess-
ment based on scenarios, both current and those yet to be realized. The rapidly chang-
ing world will present new opportunities to hostile agencies wishing to cause harm, and 
social media platforms provide ample opportunities for acquiring and deliberately dis-
seminating false information regarding biothreats. Information spreads rapidly and cre-
ates general feelings of insecurity among the general public. 
 
In this study, experience gained during field trials in Finland and Tanzania show that 
diagnostic work outside the laboratory can face many challenging situations e.g., limited 
and compromised workspace, extreme temperatures, and an unstable power supply. 
These situations can be overcome with available technology and rapid, reliable field 
diagnostic systems are realistic and within reach. It is expected that lightweight and 
highly portable “backpack laboratories” will soon become available that are battery 
powered and rely on simple robust protocols that yield easily-interpreted results. Wire-
less communication technology will enable the rapid delivery of information to decision 
makers and other parties. Such diagnostic technologies offer a reliable solution to local-
ized and rapid identification of biological agents in outbreaks or investigation programs.  
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Bacillus spp. include human pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax and a biothreat
agent. Bacillus spp. form spores that are physically highly resistant andmay remain active over sample handling.
We tested four commercial DNA extraction kits (QIAamp DNA Mini Kit, RTP Pathogen Kit, ZR Fungal/Bacterial
DNA MiniPrep, and genesig Easy DNA/RNA Extraction kit) for sample inactivation and DNA recovery from two
powders (icing sugar and potato ﬂour) spiked with Bacillus thuringiensis spores. The DNA was analysed using a
B. thuringiensis-speciﬁc real-time PCR assay. The detection limit was 3 × 101 CFU of spiked B. thuringiensis spores
with the QIAamp DNAMini, RTP Pathogen, and genesig Easy DNA/RNA Extraction kits, and 3 × 103 CFUwith the
ZR Fungal/Bacterial DNA MiniPrep kit. The results showed that manual extraction kits are effective and safe for
fast and easy DNA extraction from powder samples even in ﬁeld conditions. Adding a DNA ﬁltration step to
the extraction protocol ensures the removal of Bacillus spp. spores from DNA samples without affecting
sensitivity.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Rapid and accurate molecular detection and diagnosis of infectious
agents is crucial in preparedness for infectious diseases and biothreats
(Inglis, 2015; Zasada et al., 2015; Coyne et al., 2004). Inactivation and
nucleic acid extraction are often laborious and time-consuming steps
needed before DNA analysis. Especially when working in ﬁeld condi-
tions sample preparation is challenging and a potential cause for inaccu-
rate diagnostic results (Bonini et al., 2002; Panning et al., 2007; Lermen
et al., 2014; Wolfel et al., 2015). Safe DNA analysis is challenging if the
sample contains pathogenic bacterial spores that have remained active
after extraction with a commercial extraction kit (Dauphin and
Bowen, 2009; Panning et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2011).
Bacillus spp. includes human pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis,
the causative agent of anthrax (Schmidt et al., 2011). These Gram-pos-
itive spore-forming bacteria are found in soil and are mainly associated
with animals. Human anthrax spreads usually through infected live-
stock when handling infected animals (Goel, 2015). B. anthracis spores
enter the body either through a skin lesion (cutaneous anthrax), lungs
(pulmonary anthrax), or gastrointestinal route (gastrointestinal an-
thrax) (Anderson and Bokor, 2012). Anthrax is a public health concern
in countries where agriculture is an important source of income and
where widespread vaccination of animals is not practiced (Goel,
2015). Because of the extremely resistant spores and high mortality
rates, B. anthracis is also a potential biothreat agent (Anderson and
Bokor, 2012), and both accidental and deliberate releases have been re-
ported (Jernigan et al., 2001;U.S Department of Defence, 2015) (Jackson
et al., 1998). Another spore forming bacteria of the Bacillus genus, Bacil-
lus thuringiensis, is widely used in pesticides as it has an ability to pro-
duce toxins, which are toxic to many insect pests (Arteaga et al.,
2014). B. thuringiensis is not generally considered a human pathogen
(Kaminska et al., 2014), thus it is a suitable simulant for isolation and ex-
traction experiments with Bacillus genus spores (Janse et al., 2010b;
Carrera et al., 2007).
Manual nucleic acid extraction are in routine use to date (Ip et al.,
2015; Dauphin et al., 2011; Dauphin et al., 2010; Whitehouse and
Hottel, 2007). Contrary to the previous studies, this study has an em-
phasis on comparison of DNA extraction kits for the recovery of Bacillus
spp. spore DNA from spiked powder samples. Furthermore, the com-
pared kits are employingdifferent techniques, includingheat treatment,
spin column procedures, bead beating, and magnetic beads, and the
study focuses on applying these techniques in ﬁeld.
We compared the safety and efﬁciency of four commercial DNA ex-
traction kits (QIAamp DNAMini Kit, RTP Pathogen Kit, ZR Fungal/Bacte-
rial DNAMiniPrep, and genesig Easy DNA/RNAExtraction kit). Swift and
simplemethods that can be used in ﬁeld conditionswere preferred. The
ability of the kits to inactivate B. thuringiensis spores and the amount of
extracted DNA from spiked powder samples (icing sugar and potato
ﬂour) were evaluated. The performance of the kits was evaluated
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based on the processing time, DNA yield and purity, the need for addi-
tional laboratory equipment (e.g. heat-block, vortex), the elimination
of potential PCR inhibitors, and the sensitivity of subsequent real-time
PCR analysis. Also centrifugal ﬁlter units (Millipore Ultrafree-MC Cen-
trifugal Filter Devices) were tested for the removal of spores from
DNA samples.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Spiking and preparation of powder samples.
Icing sugar and potato ﬂourwere spikedwith an insecticidal product
(TUREX 50 WP, Certis, Columbia, MD, USA), containing B. thuringiensis
ssp. kurstaki-aizaway strain GC-91 spores. A spiking stock of TUREX
powder (4 g) and nuclease-free water (NFW) (Sigma-Aldrich, St.
Louis, MO, USA) (100 ml) was prepared. The suspension was mixed
by vortexing and divided into 1 ml aliquots and immediately stored at
−70 °C. Three aliquots were thawed and diluted ten-fold with NFW
to determine the colony forming unit (CFU) count of the spiking stock.
100 μl of dilutions from 10−6 to 10−12 were plated on two parallel ly-
sogeny broth (LB) (Bertani, 2004) plates and incubated at 37 °C for
21 h. CFU count was calculated based on the number of visible colonies.
Spiking was performed as follows: One aliquot of spiking stock (4%
TUREX suspension) was freshly thawed and serially diluted 100-fold
with NFW. Next, one part of spiking stock dilutions (10−2, 10−4, or
10−6) were added as duplicates to four parts of 10% powder
suspensions.
To control the homogeneity of the powder samples, they were han-
dled as liquid suspensions. Thus, powder sampleswere prepared freshly
by mixing 1 g of icing sugar or potato ﬂour with 10 ml of NFW. Six par-
allel powder samples were spiked with TUREX dilutions as described
above. In addition, three control sampleswere included in each DNAex-
traction assay: undiluted spiking stock as positive control and unspiked
powder suspension aswell as NFWas negative controls. All DNA extrac-
tion assays were performed with a total sample volume of 200 μl.
2.2. DNA extraction methods
DNA was extracted from a sample volume of 200 μl according to
manufacturers' protocols for difﬁcult-to-lyse or Gram-positive bacteria,
if available. Elution volume was 100 μl. DNA samples were stored at
−70 °C.When using the QIAampDNAMini Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germa-
ny), DNAwas extracted according tomanufacturer's protocol “Isolation
of genomic DNA from Gram-positive bacteria”. With RTP Pathogen Kit
(Stratec, Birkenfeld, Germany), the samples were prepared according
to manufacturer's protocol, thus adjusted from 200 μl sample volume
to a total volume of 400 μl usingNFW, and DNAwas extracted following
the protocol “Extraction of DNA from bacterial pellets” for Gram-posi-
tive bacteria. DNA extraction using the ZR Fungal/Bacterial DNA
MiniPrep (ZymoResearch, Irvine, CA, USA) kitwas performed according
to the manufacturer's protocol. No beta-mercaptoethanol was added to
the Fungal/Bacterial DNA Binding Buffer. For theGenesig Easy DNA/RNA
Extraction kit (Primerdesign, Rownhams, Southampton, UK), the sam-
ples were prepared according to manufacturer's protocol for faeces/
soil. DNA was extracted following the detailed protocol and using the
Primerdesign Magnetic Rack.
2.3. Real-time PCR analysis
10-fold serial dilutions were made of extracted DNA ranging from
10−1 to 10−4 dilutions. All analyses were run as duplicates and ampliﬁ-
cation of the targeted template area in both parallel reactions was qual-
iﬁed as a positive result. B. thuringiensis ssp. kurstaki-aizaway strain GC-
91 DNA was included in each PCR run as external positive control and
no-template-control as negative control.
DNA was detected with B. thuringiensis–speciﬁc primers and probe
targeting the cry gene, as described earlier (Matero et al., 2011). The am-
pliﬁcationmixture in a total volume of 10 μl or 20 μl contained DyNAmo
ColorFlash qPCR Mix (Thermo Scientiﬁc, Waltham, MA, USA), 0.3 μM of
forward primer, 0.9 μM of reverse primer, 0.25 μM of probe, 0.01 U/μl
AmpErase Uracil N-Glycosylase (Applied Biosystems, Carlsbad, CA,
USA) for inhibition of PCR carryover contamination, the TaqMan Exo
IPCMix and Exo IPC DNA (Applied Biosystems) as internal positive con-
trol assay, template, and NFW. PCR reactions were performed using
PikoReal Real-Time PCR System (Thermo Scientiﬁc). Reaction condi-
tions were 2 min at 50 °C, 7 min at 95 °C, followed by 45 cycles of 5 s
at 95 °C and 30 s at 60 °C.
2.4. Measuring DNA concentration and purity
The NanoDrop™ One Spectrophotometer (Thermo Scientiﬁc, Soft-
ware version 1.1.0) was used for measuring of DNA concentration and
purity after DNA extraction. The related elution buffer was used as a
blank and DNA measured from two parallel 1 μl samples per eluate.
2.5. Evaluation of bacterial spore inactivation or removal
B. thuringiensis spore inactivation was studied by incubating 10% of
the extracted DNA sample volume (i.e. 10 μl) originating from positive
extraction controls on three parallel nutrient-rich LB plates at 37 °C for
14 days. Positive extraction control DNA was chosen for plating as the
original sample (undiluted spiking stock) contained the highest spore
amount compared to the other samples, and thus it would challenge
the kits' inactivation capacity the most. Freshly thawed B. thuringiensis
spiking stock served as a positive and elution buffers from each kit as
negative plating controls.
2.6. DNA ﬁltration
Centrifugal ﬁltering was used for removal of spores from the DNA
samples originating from the positive extraction controls. 40 μl of the
extracted DNA was ﬁltered with Millipore Ultrafree-MC Centrifugal
Filter Devices with a pore size of 0.1 μm (Merck, Kenilworth, NJ, USA)
by centrifugation at 12.000 ×g for 4min. Freshly thawed B. thuringiensis
spiking stock and DNA elution buffer in question were used as controls.
The removal of the spores was veriﬁed by culturing as described above.
3. Results
A simpliﬁed workﬂow from sample preparation to DNA extraction
and subsequent analyses is presented in Fig. 1.
Depending on the kit, the processing time of nine samples varied
from65min to 155min andDNAyield from17 to 78 ng/μl (Table 1). Po-
tato ﬂour caused clogging of the RTP Pathogen Kit's spin ﬁlters and re-
duced the total volume of eluted DNA from 100 μl to approximately
45 μl (data not shown). Additional laboratory equipment was needed
with all four kits (Table 1).
The kits' efﬁciency to extract spore DNA from spiked powder sam-
ples was determined with a B. thuringiensis–speciﬁc real-time PCR
assay. The detection limit was 3 × 101 CFU of spiked spores with the
QIAampDNAMini, RTP Pathogen and genesig Easy DNA/RNAExtraction
kits, and 3 × 103 CFU with the ZR Fungal/Bacterial DNA MiniPrep kit
(Fig. 2). Internal positive control (IPC) assay was included in all real-
time PCR reactions for detection of possible PCR inhibitors. No signs of
PCR inhibitors were noticed.
To evaluate the sample inactivation efﬁciency of the extraction pro-
tocols, DNA aliquots originating from positive extraction controls were
incubated on LB plates. DNA extracted with the genesig Easy DNA/
RNA Extraction kit showed bacterial growth after 18 h of incubation
(Table 1). DNA extracted using the other three kits did not show any
bacterial growth in 14 days, after which the test was terminated. DNA
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recovered from the genesig Easy DNA/RNA Extraction kit was ﬁltered
using Millipore ﬁlters, after which no viable spores were detected by
bacterial culture. According to the real-time PCR results, ﬁltration did
not affect the sensitivity of the method.
Fig. 1. Aworkﬂow of the study from sample preparation to DNA extraction and subsequent analyses: First, powder samples and extraction controlswere prepared. Next, DNA extractions
were performed according to manufacturers' protocols for difﬁcult-to-lyse or Gram-positive bacteria. Extracted DNA was evaluated by measuring the concentration and purity, and by a
real-time PCR analysis. Bacterial spore inactivation was studied by culturing DNA originating from positive extraction controls. Finally, centrifugal ﬁltering was used for removal of spores
from the DNA samples, and veriﬁed by culturing and real-time PCR.
Table 1
Main features and performance indicators of the DNA extraction kits.
DNA extraction kit
QIAamp DNA Mini
Kit
RTP Pathogen Kit ZR Fungal/Bacterial DNA
MiniPrep
genesig Easy DNA/RNA Extraction
kit
Features Method Spin column Spin column Spin column Magnetic beads
Extra equipmenta 2 heat blocks Heat block,
thermomixer
– Magnetic rack
Lysis method Heat treatment Heat treatment Lysis solution + bead beating Lysis buffer
Cost/sample (USD)b 4.5 6.2 3.3 5.7
Performance
indicators
Spore inactivationc Yes Yes Yes No
Processing timed 155 min 100 min 65 min 105 min
DNA yielde 34 ng/μl 78 ng/μlf 17 ng/μl 41 ng/μl
DNA purity
(A260/A280)e
1.8 2.5 1.5 1.4
Ct valueg 18.4 18.7 19.0 19.4
Limit of detectionh 3 × 101 CFU 3 × 101 CFU 3 × 103 CFU 3 × 101 CFU
a In addition to a vortex and a minispin.
b Kits for 50 preparations.
c Without additional lysis or DNA ﬁltration methods.
d With nine samples.
e Average of two parallel measurements/reactions of positive extraction control samples.
f Includes carrier-RNA.
g B. thuringiensis-speciﬁc real-time PCR assay.
h Limit of detection of the extracted DNA by B. thuringiensis-speciﬁc real-time PCR assay; CFU of spiked spores.
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4. Discussion
All tested extraction kitswere considered easy to use, thus potential-
ly suitable for ﬁeld conditions. The compared extraction kits employed
different techniques, including heat treatment, spin column procedures,
bead beating, andmagnetic beads (Table 1). These techniques had anef-
fect on the processing time (Table 1) and the performance of the kits,
which was seen as sensitivity differences in real-time PCR results (Fig.
1). When following the protocols provided by the manufacturers,
three of the four kits inactivated B. thuringiensis spores.
The QIAamp DNA Mini Kit and RTP Pathogen Kit protocols included
10–15 min heat incubation steps at 95 °C and thus required heating
blocks as extra equipment in addition to a vortex and a centrifuge.
Heating is effective for sample inactivation and for elimination of
potential PCR inhibitors (Zhang et al., 2010) but is often also the
most time-consuming step. Processing time with the QIAamp DNA
Mini Kit was the slowest with 155 min and DNA yield the second
lowest with 34 ng/μl (Table 1). However, the QIAamp DNA Mini
Kit resulted the highest purity, with a A260/A280 ratio of 1.8
(Table 1).
The extraction protocol of the RTP Pathogen Kit took 100 min and –
according to NanoDrop – it yielded the most DNA (Table 1). However,
the RTP Pathogen Kit is designed for simultaneous extraction of total
nucleic acids, which in general is an advantage in ﬁeld use, but affects
the absorbance reading as the sample will contain also RNA. In addition,
carrier-RNA is included in the extraction reagents for the enhancement
of viral DNA/RNA recovery as well as for stabilization of nucleic acids in
samples. Therefore eluates will contain carrier-RNA, which – according
to the manufacturer – will greatly exceed the amount of the isolated
nucleic acids. The manual instructs that quantiﬁcation of DNA and
RNA must be done by means of ampliﬁcation or hybridization-based
measurements. Other methods, such as absorption measurements will
be disturbed by the included carrier-RNA as well as DNA or RNA
which is co-puriﬁed. This is also evident in this study, as the nucleic
acid yield was exceptional with 78 ng/μl with a high A260/A280 ratio
value of 2.5 (Table 1). Variations in total volume of eluted DNA between
the two powders indicate that the RTP Pathogen Kit's spin ﬁlters were
clogged by potato ﬂour, and can be clogged by powder samples of sim-
ilar consistency. Similar occurrence was not noticed with icing sugar.
The results suggest that this difference affects the DNA yield and conse-
quently the sensitivity of the real-time PCR (Fig. 2).
The ZR Fungal/Bacterial DNA MiniPrep protocol offered the fastest
extraction, 65 min, and the only extra equipment needed to complete
the protocol were a vortex and a mini spin. Yet the kit's performance
was the weakest with a DNA yield of 17 ng/μl (Table 1) and according
to the sensitivity of the real-time PCR analysis (Fig. 2). However, ZR Fun-
gal/Bacterial DNAMiniPrep kit has been previously used for screening of
Francisella tularensis from vole liver samples in the ﬁeld, which shows
that the performance level of such is valid for pathogen detection
from tissues (Molsa et al., 2015). Furthermore, in the previous studies
higher DNA yields have been obtained using beadmill homogenization
(Miller et al., 1999). All three kits (QIAamp DNAMini Kit, RTP Pathogen
Kit and ZR Fungal/Bacterial DNA MiniPrep kit) inactivated B.
thuringiensis spores and spore DNA could be extracted from spiked
powder samples.
Extraction process with the genesig Easy DNA/RNA Extraction kit
took 105 min and DNA yield was 41 ng/μl (Table 1). The genesig Easy
DNA/RNA Extraction kit method requires only a magnetic rack as
extra equipment, which makes it a promising candidate for ﬁeld use
where no electricity is available. However, bacterial growth occurred
on LB plates after the DNA extraction, i.e. the kit did not inactivate Bacil-
lus spores in the samples. DNA extraction with the genesig Easy DNA/
RNA Extraction kit was repeated ﬁve times and the recovery of viable
B. thuringiensiswas seen every time. According to the kit's manual, sam-
ple inactivation is achieved chemically by incubation with a lysis buffer
containing chaotropic ions supported by proteinaseK digestion andme-
chanical disruption or treatment using suitable glass beads is recom-
mended for bacteria difﬁcult to lyse. This step would require extra
equipment and time, and was therefore not done in this study aiming
to quick and easy DNA extraction. The other tested kits that inactivated
the spores completely, include either incubation periods of 10–15 min
Fig. 2. The recovery of B. thuringiensis spore DNA from spiked powder samples with four
extraction kits evaluated by B. thuringiensis-speciﬁc real-time PCR analysis. QIAamp =
QIAamp DNA Mini Kit; RTP = RTP Pathogen Kit; ZR = ZRFungal/Bacterial DNA
MiniPrep; genesig = genesig Easy DNA/RNA Extraction kit; IS = icing sugar; PF =
potato ﬂour; A and B = duplicate samples.
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at 95 °C (QIAamp DNAMini Kit, RTP Pathogen Kit) or samples are lysed
mechanically by bead beating (ZR Fungal/Bacterial DNA MiniPrep) in
addition to a lysis solution.
Icing sugar and potato ﬂour samples were spiked with an insecticid-
al product (TUREX 50 WP) containing spores of B. thuringiensis. The
spores have physical dimensions (length 2 μm, width 1 μm) similar to
B. anthracis (length 1.07 μm, diameter 0.48 μm) (Carrera et al., 2007).
This makes B. thuringiensis a usable spore simulant for B. anthracis for
DNA extraction and centrifugal ﬁlter experiments (Janse et al., 2010a).
The selected centrifugal ﬁlter units have a ﬁlter pore size of 0.1 μm,
which has been previously reported to remove spores successfully
from samples (Dauphin and Bowen, 2009). Also in this study the cen-
trifugal ﬁlter units removed the spores both from bacterial spore posi-
tive DNA samples extracted with the genesig Easy DNA/RNA
Extraction kit and from bacterial spore positive control samples. Consid-
ering the genesig Easy DNA/RNA Extraction kit's fast extraction time
with a low amount of equipment, the kit used together with the centrif-
ugal ﬁlters seems highly usable in ﬁeld conditions.
The real-time PCR results reﬂected the DNA yields: The detection
limits of the three extraction kits with higher DNA yield (QIAamp DNA
Mini Kit, RTP Pathogen Kit, genesig Easy DNA/RNA Extraction kit)
were 3 × 101 CFU of spiked B. thuringiensis spores, or one grade better
than with the ZR Fungal/Bacterial DNA MiniPrep kit (Fig. 2, Table 1).
Overall, all four kits gave consistent results in real-time PCR. The differ-
ence in cost per sample between the four tested kits was signiﬁcant but
the results indicated no clear correlation between the overall perfor-
mance and the price (Fig. 2, Table 1).
Possible impurities and/or ﬂour DNA did not seem to interfere with
detection of B. thuringiensis–speciﬁc DNA. No cross-contamination of
negative control samples was noticed with any of the tested extraction
kits. Cross-contamination is amajor concern, especiallywith automated
extraction systems (Smith et al., 2003; Knepp et al., 2003). Automated
DNA extraction methods can result in better real-time PCR detection
levels than manual extraction kits, as factors like DNA purity and con-
centration can inﬂuence the sensitivity of real-time PCR assays
(Dauphin et al., 2011). Light sample preparation methods with a small
footprint, like the tested manual extraction kits in this study, may be
more suitable in ﬁeld, e.g. used with foldable glovebox systems. A
glovebox system would also increase the biosafety of sample handling
in addition to personal protective equipment (PPE) (Wolfel et al.,
2015; Grolla et al., 2012; Panning et al., 2007).
The aim of this study was to compare the performance of four com-
mercially available DNA extraction methods for their ability to inacti-
vate bacterial spores and to extract spore DNA from spiked ﬂour
samples. The results demonstrate that the manual extraction kits
added with centrifugal ﬁlters are suitable for safe, fast, and easy extrac-
tion of bacterial DNA frompowder samples in a sophisticated laboratory
environment as well as in ﬁeld conditions.
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In the event of suspected releases or natural outbreaks of contagious pathogens, rapid identiﬁcation of the infectious
agent is essential for appropriate medical intervention and disease containment. The purpose of this study was to
compare the performance of a novel portable real-time PCR thermocycler, PikoReal™, to the standard real-time
PCR thermocycler, Applied Biosystems® 7300 (ABI 7300), for the detection of three high-risk biothreat bacterial
pathogens: Francisella tularensis, Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis. In addition, a novel conﬁrmatory real-time
PCR assay for the detection of F. tularensis is presented and validated. The results show that sensitivity of the assays,
based on a dilution series, for the three infectious agents ranged from 1 to 100 fg of target DNA with both
instruments. No cross-reactivity was revealed in speciﬁcity testing. Duration of the assays with the PikoReal and
ABI 7300 systems were 50 and 100 min, respectively. In ﬁeld testing for F. tularensis, results were obtained with
the PikoReal system in 95 min, as the pre-PCR preparation, including DNA extraction, required an additional
45 min. We conclude that the PikoReal system enables highly sensitive and rapid on-site detection of biothreat
agents under ﬁeld conditions, and may be a more efﬁcient alternative to conventional diagnostic methods.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lists three
bacterial species as category A biological threat agents: Francisella
tularensis, Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis — which cause the
human diseases tularemia, anthrax and plague, respectively (Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2015). These zoonotic agents
are highly pathogenic, causing potentially high case fatality rates, and
are a major risk to public health (Anderson and Bokor, 2012). Rapid
identiﬁcation and accurate characterization are essential for appropriate
control measures, as timely post-exposure antibiotic treatment can
usually protect against symptomatic infections (Ivnitski et al., 2003;
Irenge and Gala, 2012). The risks of these bacteria are compounded by
their ability to circulate as unnoticeable aerosols (Katz and Zilinskas,
2011), and an incubation period of up to multiple weeks following
human exposure (Anderson and Bokor, 2012; Koskela and Salminen,
1985; Dennis et al., 2001).
Several different diagnostic methods are available for the detection
of bacterial infections, e.g., staining, serology and immune assay
diagnostics (Grunow et al., 2000). However, relatively fast diagnostic
tests, such as immune assay-based rapid tests, have limited sensitivity
(Irenge and Gala, 2012), while others, such as conventional cultures,
can take several days to obtain results (Grunow et al., 2000; Hatchette
et al., 2009). Real-time PCR is well suited for the diagnostics of dangerous
bacterial agents, due to its high sensitivity and speciﬁcity, and the
possibility to inactivate samples before analysis (Grunow et al., 2000;
Hatchette et al., 2009; Pohanka and Skladal, 2009). However, robust
and reliable PCR equipment for the detection and characterization of
pathogens is often large and heavy, and the analysis process may require
several hours. Therefore, portable real-time PCR detection equipment
with high speciﬁcity and sensitivity is urgently required.
The purpose of this study was to evaluate and further develop rapid
and reliable ﬁeld diagnosis technologies for multiplex PCR purposes.
Two platforms, PikoReal (Thermo Fisher Scientiﬁc, Waltham, MA,
USA), and ABI 7300 (Life technologies Ltd, Carlsbad, CA, USA), were
compared for the real-time PCR detection of F. tularensis, B. anthracis
and Y. pestis. Furthermore, a 23 kDa PikoReal assay for the detection of
F. tularensis under ﬁeld conditions was developed and validated. We
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demonstrated that highly accurate results can be achieved with this
technology, with sensitivity and speciﬁcity comparable to established
methods used in specialized diagnostic laboratories.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Description of real-time PCR thermocyclers
The PikoReal system weighs 10 kg and is equipped with ﬁve LED
illuminated optical channels, which increases durability when compared
to standard light technologies, facilitates multiplexing, and enables
the use of internal positive controls (Thermo Fisher Scientiﬁc Inc.,
2015). The ABI 7300 is a 29 kg instrument with tungsten-halogen
lamp technology (Koskela et al., 2009). It is commonly used for
real-time PCR in diagnostic laboratories (Espy et al., 2006), and therefore
serves as an appropriate comparison to evaluate the PikoReal system.
2.2. Oligonucleotides for PCR
The bacterial strains used to evaluate sensitivity and speciﬁcity of
the real-time PCR assays are listed in Table 1 (Skottman et al., 2007;
Matero et al., 2011). Five different PCR assays were compared using
the two real-time PCR instruments (PikoReal and ABI 7300) (The oligo-
nucleotides targeted the 23 kDa and ISFtu2 genes of F. tularensis, cap and
pag genes of B. anthracis, and the pla gene of Y. pestis).
We created a novel assay for the detection of F. tularensis, targeting
the ISFtu2 gene. The other oligonucleotides used in this study have
been reported previously (Table 2) (Skottman et al., 2007). The ISFtu2
conﬁrmatory assay targets the IS-element sequence of F. tularensis,
which presents highly in the F. tularensis genome (Rohmer et al.,
2007). The designed primer and MGB-probe (Life Technology Ltd,
Carlsbad, CA, USA) combinations were based on sequences available
from the public NCBI database (Accession number AY062040). The
ISFtu2 conﬁrmatory assay was developed using the Primer Express
software, version 2.0 (Life Technologies Ltd, Carlsbad, CA, USA).
6-carboxy-ﬂuorescein (FAM) was used as the ﬂuorescent reporter
dye at the 5′ end of the probe.
Oligonucleotide concentrations for real-time PCR were optimized
in a matrix, as described previously (Skottman et al., 2007). Each PCR
assay included a negative no-template control (NTC) and a positive
DNA-control.
2.3. Optimization of the real-time PCR protocol
Three different commercial real-time PCR kits were evaluated for
ﬁeld use, following real-time PCR analysis: the QuantiFast Probe PCR
Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany), the Premix Ex Taq-kit (Takara, Shiga,
Japan) and the DyNAmo ColorFlash qPCR Kit (Fisher Scientiﬁc, Vantaa,
Finland). The DyNAmo ColorFlash qPCR kit was selected because it
presented the highest sensitivity based on threshold cycles (Ct) values
and ﬂuorescence levels. The Ct-value is the intersection between a PCR
ampliﬁcation ﬂuorescence curve and a threshold line. This kit enables
the use of Uracil-N-glycosylase (UNG) enzyme, which hydrolyses uracil-
glycosidic bonds in DNA containing dUTP and degrades the DNA into
small fragments. Therefore, contamination with previous real-time PCR
reactions is unlikely. This method also minimizes pipetting errors by
providing a multicolor pipetting tracking system. The master-mix
contains a blue dye, and a separate sample buffer contains a yellow dye.
The real-time PCR reaction mix containing both components is green.
DNA was extracted with the Zymo Research Fungal/Bacterial DNA
Mini Prep kit (Zymo Research Corp., Orange, CA). The reagents do not
require freezer or cold storage, and it is therefore possible to store and
Table 1
Real-time PCR results demonstrating speciﬁcities of the assays targeting 23 kDa and ISFtu2 genes of F. tularensis, cap and pag genes of B. anthracis and pla-gene of Y. pestis. (−) describes a
negative result and (+) describes a positive result.
Bacillus anthracis Francisella
tularensis
Yersinia pestis Francisella spp.
(pag) (cap) (23 kDa) (pla) (ISFtu2)
Species Strain(s) Source1 ABI
7300
PikoReal ABI
7300
PikoReal ABI
7300
PikoReal ABI
7300
PikoReal ABI
7300
PikoReal
Agrobacterium tumefaciens C58C1/RP4 1 − − − − − − − − − −
B. anthracis ATCC 4229 (pXO1-/pXO2+) 2 − − + + − − − − − −
B. anthracis Sterne 7702 (pXO1+/pXO2-) 2 + + − − − − − − − −
B. cereus ELMI 21 2 − − − − − − − − − −
B. licheniformis ELMI 325 2 − − − − − − − − − −
B. mycoides ELMI 44 2 − − − − − − − − − −
B. thuringiensis ELMI 123 2 − − − − − − − − − −
B. thuringiensis Subsp. kurstaki-aizaway 3 − − − − − − − − − −
Brucella melitensis 72, biotype 3 4 − − − − − − − − − −
Enterobacter cloacae tks461 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Escheria coli C600/pYET6 1 − − − − − − − − − −
F. tularensis LVS (ATCC 29684) 5 − − − − + + − − + +
Moraxella catarrhalis 035E 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Staphylococcus aureus ATCC 25923 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Y. bercovieri 3016/84 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Y. enterocolitica 1309/80 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Y. intermedia 9/85 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Y. kristensenii 119/84 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Y. mollaretii 92/84 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Y. pestis EV76-c 1 − − − − − − + + − −
Y. pestis KIM D1 1 − − − − − − + + − −
Y. pseudotuberculosis H305-36/89 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Y. pseudotuberculosis No.90 1 − − − − − − − − − −
Y. ruckeri RS41 1 − − − − − − − − − −
1The sources are:
(1) Laboratory Strain collection, Department of Bacteriology and Immunology, University of Helsinki.
(2) Laboratory Strain Collection, Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira.
(3) Puriﬁed from a commercial insecticide.
(4) Institute of Microbiology, German Armed Forces, Munich, Germany.
(5) Laboratory Strain Collection, FOI, Umeå, Sweden.
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use the kit at room temperature. These stable reagents and the short
manual protocol enable isolation of DNA from one sample in 15 min.
The DNA extraction method, including all required instruments,
was packed into a portable case (Sniegel design, Sweden) for ﬁeld
deployment.
2.4. Sensitivity and speciﬁcity testing of the PCR assays
Sensitivity and speciﬁcity of the F. tularensis, B. anthracis and Y. pestis
assays were each evaluated with the PikoReal and ABI 7300 real-time
PCR systems. Sensitivity of the assays was tested using serial tenfold
dilutions of DNA extracted from F. tularensis LVS (ATCC29684),
B. anthracis (Sterne 7702, pXO1+/pXO2- and ATCC 4229, pXO1-/
pXO2+) and Y. pestis (EV76-c and KIM D1) strains. The speciﬁcity of
the assays was evaluated with DNA extracted from 24 clinical and
environmental bacterial species (Table 1).
Real-time PCR assays with both PCR platforms were performed in
duplicate as part of a dilution series and each reaction was carried out
with optimized oligo concentrations and a 2,5 μl DNA template in a
ﬁnal volume of 25 μl (Table 2). A no-template control (NTC) consisting
of water instead of DNA as template, and a positive control containing
bacterial DNA, was included in each assay. Real-time PCR assays with
the PikoReal and ABI 7300 systemswere performed using the following
thermocycling parameters: 1 min at 60 °C and 2 min at 50 °C, 7 min at
95 °C, 45 cycles of 5 s each at 95 °C; 30 s at 60 °C, and 2 min at 50 °C,
10 min at 95 °C, 40 cycles of 15 s each at 95 °C respectively.
Data analysis was performedwith the ABI 7300 software version 1.4
(ABI) and PikoReal SW-software version 2.0 (Thermo Fisher Scientiﬁc).
Tests were performed at the diagnostic laboratory of the National
Institute for Health and Welfare, Finland (THL).
2.5. Detection of F. tularensis using the PikoReal instrument under simulated
ﬁeld conditions
The PikoReal technology was also evaluated under ﬁeld conditions.
The PikoReal was packed into a compact, portable and shock and
water resistant Pelican box (Pelican Products Inc., Torrance, CA), together
with the entire hardware requisite for real-time PCR, e.g., a laptop with
PikoReal software, and conductor rails for power supply. The DNA extrac-
tion equipment was transported in a separate case, as described above.
Rodent (voles and lemmings) liver samples were used to test for
the presence of F. tularensis. These rodents were captured via snap
(kill)-trapping at sites across Finland, dissected, and liver samples
were collected and stored at−20 °C for subsequent DNA extraction.
Liver has been previously demonstrated as an appropriate tissue for
tularemia detection (Rossow et al., 2014a).
A total of 1035 sampleswere analyzed for F. tularensis (23 kDa) using
the PikoReal assay at the Suonenjoki Research Station of the Finnish
Forest Research Institute (now the Natural Resources Institute Finland)
and the Kilpisjärvi Biological Station of the University of Helsinki. These
facilities do not contain specialized diagnostic laboratories. From
these samples 147 were also analyzed for F. tularensis (23 kDa)
with the ABI 7300 system, including an internal positive control
(IPC), as a conﬁrmatory instrument platform in a well-equipped
diagnostic laboratory at THL. The concentration and purity of the extract-
ed DNA from the 147 samples was determined with the Nanodrop
ND-1000 spectrophotometer (Thermo Scientiﬁc, Wilmington, DE, USA).
Although all these rodent samples were negative to F. tularensis, they
served to permit the large-scale utilization of the portable assay system
outside of specialized diagnostic laboratories. These negative results are
not surprising given the low and focal prevalence of F. tularensis in
Finland (Splettstoesser et al., 2009; Rossow et al., 2014a), and rapid lethal
clinical course of infection in rodents (Rossow et al., 2014b).
To further evaluate the process, ﬁve previously known F. tularensis
positive vole liver samples (Rossow et al., 2014a) were extracted with
the Zymo Research Fungal/Bacterial DNAMini Prep kit (Zymo Research
Corp., Orange, CA) and with the previously used reference extraction
method, theWizard®GenomicDNAPuriﬁcation Kit (Promega,Madison,
USA). ExtractedDNA sampleswere analyzedwithboth the PikoReal and
ABI 7300 systems at the THL laboratory.
2.6. Ethics and biosafety
All animal trapping took place with permission (1013/204/2002) on
land owned by the Finnish Forest and Park Service. Permits (23/5713/
2001, 4/5713/2007) for capturing protected species (here Lemmus
lemmus) were granted by the Finnish Ministry of the Environment.
Other species captured in this study are not protected in Finland and
none of the captured species are included in the Red List of Endangered
Species.
All animal tissue samples were inactivated with lysis buffer in the
ﬁeld prior to DNA extractions, and real-time PCR testing. Laboratory
personal protective equipment (PPE) was used when handling tissue
samples and working with the DNA-extraction protocol and real-time
PCR. Following PCRs, remaining samples of extracted DNA and their
tubes were disposed of into biohazardous waste bins, which were
collected by a private contractor for incineration.
3. Results
The duration of all PCR assays with the PikoReal and ABI 7300
technologies were 50 and 100 min, respectively. The sensitivity of
assays ranged from 1 to 100 fg of chromosomal F. tularensis LVS
Table 2
The oligonucleotides were designed and optimized in ﬁnal concentration to target 23 kDa and ISFtu2 genes of F. tularensis, cap and pag genes of B. anthracis and the pla gene of Y. pestis.
Target gene Primer and probe sequences Final concentration nM Amplicon length (bp) References
ABI 7300 PikoReal
cap Forward 5′-TTG GGA ACG TGT GGA TGA TTT-3′ 300 900 69 Skottman et al. (2007)
Reverse 5′-TCA GGG CGG CAA TTC ATA AT-3′ 900 900
Probe 5′-FAM-TAG TAA TCT AGC TCC AAT TGT-MGBNFQ-3′ 250 250
pag Forward 5′-CGG ATA GCG GCG GTT AAT C-3′ 300 900 85 Skottman et al. (2007)
Reverse 5′-CAA ATG CTA TTT TAA GGG CTT CTT TT-3′ 900 900
Probe 5′-FAM-TAG AAA CGA CTA AAC CGG ATA T-MGBNFQ-3′ 250 250
23 kDa Forward 5′-TGA GAT GAT AAC AAG ACA ACA GGT AAC A-3′ 300 900 84 Skottman et al. (2007)
Reverse 5′-GGA TGA GAT CCT ATA CAT GCA GTA GGA-3′ 900 900
Probe 5′-FAM-CCA TTC ATG TGA GAA CTG -MGBNFQ-3′ 250 250
ISFtu2 Forward 5′-TGC TTG TGC TAC GGG ATA TGA TA-3′ 300 300 98 This study
Reverse 5′-CTA AAG CAT CAG TCA TAG CAT GGA TT-3′ 900 900
Probe 5′-FAM- AGA TGA TAA CCA AGC AAT T-MGBNFQ-3′ 250 250
pla Forward 5′-GAA AGG AGT GCG GGT AAT AGG TT-3′ 50 300 63 Skottman et al. (2007)
Reverse 5′-CCT GCA AGT CCA ATA TAT GGC ATA-3′ 300 900
Probe 5′-FAM-TAA CCA GCG CTT TTC -MGBNFQ-3′ 250 250
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(ATCC29684), B. anthracis (Sterne 7702, pXO1+/pXO2- and ATCC
4229, pXO1-/pXO2+) and Y. pestis (EV76-c and KIM D1) DNA, as
determined by 10 parallel analyses with each platform (Table 3).
Highest sensitivity of the PikoReal system was obtained with 45 cycles,
as compared to 40 cycles with the ABI 7300 system.
The novel conﬁrmatory ISFtu2 assay for F. tularensis presented similar
sensitivity to the 23 kDa assay (Fig. 1). In addition, the ISFtu2 assay also
detects F. philomiragia, which is not possible with the 23 kDa assay. No
cross-reactivity was seen between species-speciﬁc assays or with DNA
extracted from the 24 different other bacterial species used as templates
(Table 1).
When analyzing rodent samples at the research stations in Suonenjoki
and Kilpisjärvi, real-time PCR results using the PikoReal instrument were
obtained in 95 min as the pre-PCR preparations, including DNA extrac-
tion, required approximately 45min. Results from the PikoReal screening
for F. tularensis at the research stations were in agreement with the 147
samples analyzed with both the ABI 7300 and PikoReal instruments in
the diagnostic laboratory at THL. In all cases, the positive control was
correctly identiﬁed. The ﬁve positive F. tularensis vole liver samples
were accurately detected with both the PikoReal and ABI 7300 systems
at the THL laboratory.
4. Discussion
A strong need exists for rapid, portable and reliable diagnostic
methods for extremely contagious pathogens (Dennis et al., 2001;
Grunow et al., 2012). Sensitivity and speciﬁcity of detection assays, as
well as size and weight of the detection equipment, are the most impor-
tant technical issues for the development of real-time PCR based assays
for ﬁeld use (Ivnitski et al., 2003). Due to suboptimal sensitivity with
some of the available rapid immunoassay detection tests, nucleic acid
based detection assays are becoming increasingly important to enable
the fast and sensitive identiﬁcation of harmful pathogens (Grunow
et al., 2000; Hatchette et al., 2009; Irenge and Gala, 2012).
In this study, the ﬁeld-deployable PikoReal system was used to
develop a diagnostic assay for the reliable detection of selected biothreat
bacterial agents.We found that this novel technology allows for rapid and
sensitive detection of F. tularensis, B. anthracis and Y. pestis, and is suitable
for utilization outside of sophisticated diagnostic laboratories. The
PikoReal system demonstrated equal sensitivity and speciﬁcity when
compared to a standard real-time PCR technology (ABI 7300).
Technical limitations often restrict the use of PCR diagnostics outside
of sophisticated laboratories. One of the problemswithmany diagnostic
PCR-based methodologies is the potential accumulation of ampliﬁed
DNA fragments, which eventually lead to false positive results through
contamination of sample materials and reagents (Burd, 2010). With
the PikoReal assay the ampliﬁcation occurs in a closed reaction plate.
This effectively separates the ampliﬁed product from any part of the
hardware and the environment. In addition, the selected real-time
PCR methodology lowers pipetting and contamination risks when
compared to PCR methods that require the reaction tubes to be opened
during analysis.
Analyses with the PikoReal system proved to be simple and time-
efﬁcient. In our ﬁeld trials, reliable results were achieved in approx-
imately 90 min, from the beginning of sample preparation to the
completion of the diagnostic PCR. These times are further enhanced
by the lack of transportation required to deliver samples to specialized
diagnostic laboratories. All assay-speciﬁc primers and probes, in both
the PikoReal and the ABI 7300 systems, correctly identiﬁed all assay-
speciﬁc positive controls while no cross-reactivity was observed.
Compared to earlier described portable PCR technologies (Koskela
et al., 2009; Pierce et al., 2010; Matero et al., 2011; Molsa et al., 2012;
Arif et al., 2013), the PikoReal system provides technical advances by
facilitating multiplexing, and modules for absolute and relative quanti-
ﬁcation as well as melting curve analysis. These advances enhance the
capabilities of the equipment for research use. The multicolor pipetting
tracking system and possibility to use UNG-enzyme provided by the
DyNAmo Color Flash qPCR kit, further increase the reliability of the
assay. However, the performance of the ﬁeld assays could be simpliﬁed
by the development of stabilized or lyophilized real-time PCR reagents
and assays with RT storage capability.
Fig. 1. The novel conﬁrmatory ISFtu2 assay for F. tularensis achieved similar sensitivity to the 23 kDa assay. Results are based onﬁve F. tularensis positive samples testedwith each real-time
PCR instrument (PikoReal and ABI 7300).
Table 3
The detection limit of the assays ranged from1 to 100 fg of chromosomalDNA. Thehighest
sensitivity with PikoReal thermocycler andwith ISFtu2 assay was obtainedwith 45 cycles.
Target bacteria Sensitivity (limit of detection)1
Target gene ABI 7300
(40 cycles)
PikoReal
(45 cycles)
Bacillus anthracis cap 100 fg 100 fg
pag 10 fg 10 fg
Francisella tularensis 23 kDa 10 fg 10 fg
ISFtu2 10 fg 1 fg
Yersinia pestis pla 10 fg 10 fg
1 Amount of genomic DNA based on dilution series.
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The PikoReal technology presents a strong candidate for further
development to support more common public health diagnostic
needs, such as respiratory disease-causing agents in primary health
care settings. This lightweight and compact system allows rapid and
sensitive detection of selected agents, and can be deployed outside of
specialized diagnostic laboratories, rendering specimen transportation
obsolete, and thereby greatly reducing time requirements and exposure
risks.
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a  b  s  t r  a  c t
Timely  identiﬁcation  of respiratory pathogens  is  essential for appropriate patient  care and  cohorting.
In  order to do  rapid  identiﬁcation-technology near the patient  we utilized the ﬁeld-deployable RAZOR
EX-thermocycler  with  a reverse  transcription  real-time PCR  assay  that  detects all subtypes  of inﬂuenza A
virus.  In  addition,  we developed a  RT PCR  assay  for  speciﬁc  detection  of inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09  virus.
These  assays  ampliﬁed  segments  of  the matrix  (M)- and the  hemagglutinin  (HA)-gene, respectively.
Detection limits  of  the  M-gene  and the  inﬂuenza  A(H1N1)pdm09-speciﬁc HA-gene assays were 0.15  PFU
and  8.8 PFU  per  reaction, respectively. With  18  inﬂuenza  A viruses of  different  subtypes  and  inﬂuenza  B,
C,  and 7  other respiratory viruses the  RAZOR  EX  and  standard  real-time PCR  assay results were in total
agreement.  From 104  clinical  samples  identical  results  were  obtained by  both  PCR  methods.  Additional
21  clinical  samples were tested  under  ﬁeld conditions with the  RAZOR  EX instrument. Results  were
achieved  in  90  min, including  45  min  for sample  preparation  and they were in  complete  agreement  with
those  obtained  by  standard  real-time  PCR  under  laboratory conditions. These  methods enable  highly
sensitive  and  rapid  on-site  diagnostics to reliably identify  patients infected  with inﬂuenza  A, including
the inﬂuenza  A(H1N1)pdm09-virus.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
The 2009 inﬂuenza A  pandemic was a reminder that accurate
diagnosis of respiratory tract infections remains a difﬁcult task for
the diagnostic laboratory, and although well-suited for outbreak
investigations, available rapid point-of-care tests often lack sensi-
tivity to identify single patients (Cheng et al.,  2010; Ortiz de la Tabla
et al., 2010). In the present study a ﬁeld-compatible, portable PCR
instrument was evaluated for the  rapid, near-patient detection of
inﬂuenza A viruses including A(H1N1)pdm09 in  clinical specimens
and compared with results obtained by a well-established real-time
PCR instrument used under laboratory conditions.
Oligonucleotides for the  speciﬁc detection of inﬂuenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 were designed by aligning publicly available
nucleotide sequences of  segment 4 encoding the  hemagglutinin
(HA)-gene of inﬂuenza A viruses and used in reverse transcriptase
(RT) polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay (Table 1). In preliminary
experiments (Rönkkö et  al., 2011) the  inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09-
speciﬁc assay described here  proofed to be ten times more sensitive
than the one published by CDC (Dawood et al., 2009). As a ref-
erence assay a published PCR targeting the matrix (M)-protein
was used for broad-range detection of  all subtypes of inﬂuenza A
viruses (Munster et al., 2005; Ward et al., 2004) (Table 1). Testing of
virus strains and clinical samples was performed with the  RAZOR
EX instrument (Idaho Technology, Salt  Lake City, UT;  software
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +358 299 580300; fax: +358 299 580339.
E-mail  address: simo.nikkari@mil.ﬁ (S. Nikkari).
version 4.1), and results were compared to  those obtained with
the Applied Biosystems 7300  thermocycler (ABI 7300; ABI, Foster
City, CA; software version 1.4). Both methods use Taqman chem-
istry. Initially, three different commercial RT PCR kits with ﬁve
different protocols were evaluated for their performance by RT PCR.
The One Step  PrimeScript RT  PCR Kit (Takara Bio Inc., Otsu, Japan)
was selected for further use because highest test sensitivity was
achieved repeatedly with this  kit  (data not shown). All  PCR anal-
yses were  performed in duplicate according to the manufacturer’s
instructions. With the exception of the extension step, the thermal
cycling proﬁle was identical for  the ABI and  RAZOR methods and
consisted of 5 min  at  42 ◦C, 10 s at  95 ◦C, followed by 55 cycles of
5 s at 95 ◦C and 34  s or  20 s, respectively, at  60 ◦C. A  no template
control (NTC)  consisting of water instead of RNA, and  a positive
control containing viral RNA were included in  all PCR runs. The
cell culture-grown inﬂuenza viruses A/Panama/2007/99(H3N2) or
A/Finland/554/09(H1N1)pdm09 were  included as positive controls
in the M-protein and HA-gene assays, respectively, on both PCR
methods.
The detection limits of the inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09-assay and
the broad-reacting inﬂuenza A type-speciﬁc assay were 8.8 PFU
(plaque forming units) of cultured  A/Finland/554/09 virus and
as little as 0.15 PFU of  cultured  A/Panama/2007/99(H3N2) virus,
respectively (data not shown). The speciﬁcity of the assays was
tested with RNA from 18 inﬂuenza A viruses representing ﬁve dif-
ferent subtypes, the inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, as well as
with nine other common respiratory viruses obtained from the
0166-0934/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Table  1
Primers and probes as well as  their optimal assay concentrations for type-speciﬁc and subtype-speciﬁc detection of inﬂuenza A and inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09,  respectively.
Target gene Primer Nucleotide sequence Size of amplicon (bp) Optimal concentrations (nM)
InfA matrix Forward 5′-AAG  ACC  AAT  CCT GTC ACC TCT GA-3′ 95 900
Reverse 5′-CAA AGC  GTC TAC  GCT  GCA GTC C-3′ 900
Probe 5′-FAM-TTT GTG  TTC ACG CTC ACC GTG CC-MGBNFQ-3′ 250
InfA(H1N1)pdm09  hemagglutinin Forward 5′-CAG GGA  TGG  TAG ATG GAT  GGT  AC-3′ 122 900
Reverse 5′-AAC  AGA  ATT TAC  TTT GTT AGT AAT  YTC  GTC  A-3′ 900
Probe 5′-FAM-CAG GAT ATG CAG CCG ACC  TGA  AGA  GCA-BHQ-3′ 250
National Inﬂuenza Centre (National Institute for Health and Wel-
fare, Helsinki, Finland) (Table 2). With the  M gene-speciﬁc reference
assay, all inﬂuenza A-subtypes gave a positive signal while none  of
the other nine common respiratory viruses  included in the  con-
trol panel were ampliﬁed (Table 2). With the  new assay described
below, which is speciﬁc for the inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, all
the six pandemic inﬂuenza virus strains were positive (Table 2),
while no reactivity was seen when other subtypes of inﬂuenza A or
other common respiratory viruses were used as template. No dif-
ference in sensitivity or  speciﬁcity between the  ABI 7300 and the
RAZOR EX-methods was observed.
RNA from 104 combined nasal and throat swabs was  puriﬁed
with the Qiagen RNeasy Mini  Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) using
the Qiacube instrument. These samples had  been collected from
military recruits presenting with symptoms of febrile upper respi-
ratory tract infection during an outbreak in one garrison during the
pandemic wave in the  autumn of  2009 (Aho et al.,  2010). One swab
was used to collect material from both nostrils, the throat was  sam-
pled with the second swab. Both swabs were  placed into the  same
tube containing 3 ml of transport medium (Copan UTM-RT, Copan
Diagnostics Inc., Corona, CA). Of  these 104 clinical samples, 65  were
inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09-positive and 39  negative, respectively,
using both assays and PCR  methods.
To demonstrate near-patient suitability of the  RAZOR EX-
technology, 21 clinical samples were tested under ﬁeld conditions
at a health care center of a  military garrison Representative results
from the analyses of these samples are  shown in Fig. 1.  RNA was
extracted with the ZR  Viral  RNA Kit  (Zymo Research, Orange, CA).
After vortexing the clinical specimen for 1 min, an aliquot of 100 l
was  transferred into a tube containing 300 l  of lysis buffer (ZR Viral
RNA Buffer), and the  extraction was  performed according to man-
ufacturer’s protocol. In the ﬁnal step the  RNA was eluted in  35  l of
RNase-free water. RT PCR procedures with the RAZOR EX were per-
formed as described above. With the RAZOR EX-instrument results
could be obtained within 45 min  from the beginning of PCR and  an
additional 45 min were required for  the RNA extraction.
Optimally, laboratory conﬁrmation of  the disease-causing agent
should be done near the  patient in order to reduce time lost
by specimen transportation. Unfortunately, some of  the available
point-of-care tests have suboptimal sensitivity (Ortiz de  la  Tabla
et al., 2010) and cannot differentiate between pandemic and sea-
sonal inﬂuenza viruses. On the other hand, technical constraints
have thus far  limited the use of PCR diagnosis near the patient, i.e.,
in a  local  health care center or a physician’s ofﬁce.
Portable thermocyler-technologies help to  overcome these lim-
itations. Recently, Wang et al. (2009) used the Smart Cycler
instrument for identiﬁcation of human and avian inﬂuenza A-
viruses. However, the Smart Cycler is considerably larger and
heavier (33.6 kg) than  the compact and light weight (4.9 kg)  RAZOR
EX that is easily transportable by one person. Besides, the RAZOR EX
performs thermocycling rapidly. In experiments carried out during
this study reliable results were  achieved in 1.5 h  from  the begin-
ning of sample preparation to  completion of the PCR,  whereas for
the Smart Cycler signiﬁcantly longer period were required (Wang
Table 2
Analytical PCR results demonstrating speciﬁcities of  the developed assays targeting the inﬂuenza A matrix gene and  the hemagglutinin gene of  inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 for
type-speciﬁc  inﬂuenza A (InfA) and subtype-speciﬁc inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 (InfA(H1N1pdm09)) detection, respectively. In addition 104 clinical samples were studied.
Virus Source InfA InfA(H1N1)pdm09
Inﬂuenza A, A/Panama/2007/99 (H3N2) Cultured virus + −
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/81/08 (H3N2) Clinical sample + −
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/149/08 (H3N2) Clinical sample + −
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/209/08 (H1N1) Clinical sample + −
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/213/08 (H1N1) Clinical sample + −
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Mallard/Neth/12/00 (H7N3) Cultured virus + −
Inﬂuenza  A, A/HK/1073/99 (H9N2) Cultured virus + −
Inﬂuenza  A H5N1  Clade 1  Reference specimena + −
Inﬂuenza  A H5N1  Clade 2.1 Reference specimena + −
Inﬂuenza  A H5N1  Clade 2.2 Reference specimena + −
Inﬂuenza  A H5N1  Clade 2.3.2 Reference specimena + −
Inﬂuenza  A H5N1  Clade 2.3.4 Reference specimena + −
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/544/09 (H1N1)pdm09 Clinical sample + +
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/571/09 (H1N1)pdm09 Clinical sample + +
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/577/09 (H1N1)pdm09 Clinical sample + +
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/579/09 (H1N1)pdm09 Clinical sample + +
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/582/09 (H1N1)pdm09 Clinical sample + +
Inﬂuenza  A, A/Fin/554/09 (H1N1)pdm09 Cultured virus + +
Inﬂuenza  B Clinical sample − −
Inﬂuenza  C, C/Ann Arbor/1/50 Cultured virus − −
Parainﬂuenza  virus 1 Clinical sample − −
Parainﬂuenza  virus 2 Clinical sample − −
Parainﬂuenza  virus 3 Clinical sample − −
Respiratory  syncytial virus Clinical sample − −
Bocavirus  Clinical sample − −
Human  metapneumovirus Clinical sample − −
Adenovirus  (type 7a) Cultured virus − −
a Obtained through the WHO  external quality assessment program. The  A(H5N1)  viruses represent 5 different clades and subclades
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Fig. 1. Real-time RT PCR ampliﬁcation of  inﬂuenza A virus-speciﬁc gene segments with the RAZOR EX (A  and B) and ABI 7300-instruments (C and  D).  RNA  isolated from
combined  nasal and throat swabs of four  patients with inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 infection was  reverse transcribed and ampliﬁed by  55 cycles. Specimens were  tested in
duplicates  by the RAZOR  EX instrument. A  speciﬁc product was  ampliﬁed from all samples when inﬂuenza A type-speciﬁc (A  and C) and inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 subtype-
speciﬁc  primers (B and D) were used. The RAZOR  EX-analyses were performed under ﬁeld conditions. A  no template control (NTC) and  a positive control were included in all
runs  (A and B). Real-time RT PCR ampliﬁcation with the ABI 7300-instrument was done under standard laboratory conditions (C and D).  Results obtained with the RAZOR
EX-instrument  under ﬁeld conditions were in complete agreement with those  obtained with the ABI 7300-instrument under standard laboratory conditions.
et al., 2009). A previous version of the RAZOR instrument has
been used for the detection of  Vibrio cholera (Koskela et  al., 2009),
Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Francisella tularensis, and Yersinia
pestis (Matero et al., 2011) and its applicability under near-patient
ﬁeld conditions has been clearly demonstrated.
Ct-values obtained by the ABI 7300 were  consistently 3.5–6.5
cycles lower than those obtained by the  RAZOR EX-instrument,
similarly as has been described earlier (Koskela et al., 2009). Despite
these differences in the  algorithms to determine cut-off values, the
actual methodological sensitivities, as determined by analysis of
serial dilutions of template and the  diagnostic accuracy, did  not
vary between the ABI and RAZOR EX-methods.
The results demonstrate the feasibility of a portable thermocy-
cler designed for ﬁeld use in the rapid diagnosis of inﬂuenza A-virus
infections. This technology provides high sensitivity and speciﬁcity
combined  with speed and can be performed near the patient with-
out the  need for  shipping of the sample to a diagnostic laboratory.
This makes the RAZOR EX-method particularly suitable for out-
break investigations. In our hands the RAZOR EX-method exhibited
equal assay sensitivity and speciﬁcity as compared to  standard real-
time PCR technology (ABI 7300). These assays could be simpliﬁed
further by using pre-fabricated kits, e.g., lyophilized reagents in the
reaction pouches, and development of  assays for other important
respiratory pathogens should be considered.
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Although adenoviruses were identiﬁed as im-
portant respiratory pathogens many years ago,
little information is available concerning the
prevalence of different adenovirus serotypes,
which are circulating and causing epidemics in
Finnish military training centers. Over a period
of ﬁve years from 2008 to 2012, 3577 respira-
tory specimens were collected from military
conscripts presenting with symptoms compat-
ible with acute respiratory tract infection. Upon
initial testing for certain respiratory viruses by
real-time PCR, 837 of these specimens were
identiﬁed as adenovirus-positive. For 672 of
these specimens, the serotype of the adenovi-
rus responsible was successfully determined
by DNA sequencing. Serotypes 1, 2, 3, and 4
were detected in 1, 3, 181, and 487 samples,
respectively. Adenovirus epidemics were ob-
served during each year of this study. Based
on these ﬁndings, adenovirus vaccination
should be considered for military conscripts in
the Finnish Defence Forces. J. Med. Virol. 88:
571–577, 2016. # 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
KEY WORDS: respiratory infection; military
training centers; real-time
PCR; genetic sequence
INTRODUCTION
Upper respiratory tract infections are the most
common infectious diseases among persons of all age
groups and they are mostly caused by viruses. Occa-
sionally these viruses reach the lower respiratory
tract, causing bronchitis, bronchiolitis, and pneumo-
nia, which can often be severe, even life-threatening.
Respiratory viruses are easily transmitted in crowded
conditions, such as in day-care centers, schools, and
especially in military garrisons [Gray et al., 1999;
World Health Organization, 2008; O’Shea and Wil-
son, 2013]. Overcrowding, physical and mental stress
and frequent traveling may predispose an individual
to infection with respiratory pathogens. Respiratory
infections have been recognized for a long time as a
common illness among military recruits during their
service [Top, 1975; Sanchez et al., 2001]. Particularly
in garrisons, epidemics caused by respiratory viruses
are often characterized by a sudden onset, and the
rapid identiﬁcation of the pathogen may help in
planning appropriate counter-measures and treat-
ment strategies.
Adenoviruses are a common cause of acute respira-
tory diseases globally. For many years, adenovirus-
associated acute respiratory illnesses have been re-
ported among adults, including military populations
[Gray et al., 2000]. Epidemics caused by adenoviruses
can be associated with high levels of morbidity
[Potter et al., 2012]. Adenoviruses can cause a wide
range of clinical manifestations, ranging from mild to
severe infections. The most common clinical presenta-
tions of adenovirus infections are pneumonia, bron-
chitis, upper respiratory tract infections, and common
cold symptoms [Kunz and Ottolini, 2010]. Some
adenoviruses are related to follicular conjunctivitis or
pharyngoconjunctival fever and highly contagious
keratoconjunctivitis [Lenaerts et al., 2008]. Among
immunocompetent individuals, adenovirus infections
are generally mild but sometimes, particularly in
immunocompromised patients, adenovirus infections
can cause severe disease [Tebruegge and Curtis,
2012].
Currently 60 human adenovirus serotypes are
known. They are divided into seven subgroups (A to
Conflict of interest: None
Correspondence to: Markos M€ols€a, Centres for Military
Medicine and for Biological Threat Preparedness, Tukholmanka-
tu 8A, FI-00290, Helsinki, Finland. E-mail: markos.molsa@mil.fi
Accepted 19 August 2015
DOI 10.1002/jmv.24364
Published online 14 September 2015 in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com).
C 2015 WILEY PERIODICALS, INC.
ARTICLE IV
G) on the basis of hemagglutination features, DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) homology, and genomic organ-
ization [Robinson et al., 2013]. The majority of
adenovirus infections are diagnosed in children, but
they are increasingly also recognized as illnesses in
adults [Cesario, 2012]. Several serotypes have been
associated with a variety of diseases in humans.
Among adults, adenovirus subgroup B (serotypes 3,
7, and 21), subgroup C (serotypes 1, 2, and 5) and
subgroup E (serotype 4) are common causes of
respiratory tract infection and are frequently associ-
ated with outbreaks among civilians and in the
United States (US) Armed Forces [Brosch et al.,
2009; Lu et al., 2013].
Since the 1950s, it had been recognized that US
military recruits are prone to adenovirus infections,
particularly types 4 and 7. Many recruits infected
with these adenoviruses develop pneumonia and
require hospitalization [Sivan et al., 2007; Brosch
et al., 2009; Hoke and Snyder, 2013]. A live oral
vaccine to prevent infections with adenovirus types 4
and 7 was introduced in the early 1970s, and was
shown to signiﬁcantly reduce febrile respiratory ill-
nesses in vaccinated recruits [Kolavic-Gray et al.,
2002; Russell et al., 2006]. After years of successful
use, vaccine production was discontinued by the only
manufacturer in 1996, which resulted in a resurgence
of adenovirus-induced respiratory illnesses among
military recruits [Gray et al., 2000]. A large outbreak
of adenovirus occurred at Fort Jackson in 1997,
during which type 4 was isolated in 50 percent of 147
trainees hospitalized with acute respiratory disease.
Deaths associated with adenovirus infections have
adenovirus infections have [McNeill et al., 2000;
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
2001; Kolavic-Gray et al., 2002]. Morbidity associated
with adenovirus four rapidly increased during the
years 1997–1998 as remaining vaccine stocks were
progressively consumed. In 1999, when the vaccine
was no longer available, adenovirus four quickly
became responsible for 98 percent of all diagnosed
cases of adenovirus infections in US military person-
nel [Russell et al., 2006]. Furthermore, the lack of
adenovirus vaccine resulted in adenovirus outbreaks
during 1997–2000 in US military training facilities,
and high rates of adenovirus infection were reported
[Kolavic-Gray et al., 2002]. With vaccine no longer
available, efforts to control endemic spread and
epidemics have been largely unsuccessful [Russell
et al., 2006]. However, a new oral vaccine against
adenovirus types 4 and 7 was approved by the US
Food and Drug Administration in March 2011, and
after a break of several years, the adenovirus vacci-
nation program for military recruits resumed in
October 2011 [Potter et al., 2012; Hoke and Snyder,
2013; Radin et al., 2014].
Respiratory viruses are the source of signiﬁcant
outbreaks of illness among military conscripts in
Finland each year, commonly during late winter and
early spring [Hulkko et al., 2010]. Finnish garrisons
actively participate in the sentinel surveillance for
viral respiratory infections coordinated by the Insti-
tute for National Health and Welfare (THL). This
surveillance provides detailed information on the
circulation of various respiratory viruses in the
Finnish population as well as on the properties of
these viruses. Outbreaks of inﬂuenza A and/or B are
registered every year. Parainﬂuenza viruses 1, 2, and
3 as well as respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) usually
cause very limited outbreaks or present as isolated
cases [Hulkko et al., 2010]. However, the Finnish
Defence Forces has had little information on the
adenovirus serotypes circulating in Finland. The
present study sheds light on the different adenovirus
serotypes causing outbreaks in the Finnish Defence
Forces over a period of 5 years. This information may
serve in considerations as to whether or not adenovi-
rus vaccine might reduce adenovirus-associated mor-
bidity in military conscripts.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Adenovirus Samples
Nasopharyngeal aspirates or combined ﬂocked na-
sal and throat swab samples (Copan, Brescia, Italy)
were collected by staff physicians or nurses, from
military conscripts with acute respiratory infections
(ARI) for sentinel surveillance of respiratory infec-
tions conducted by THL. Conscripts presenting with
inﬂuenza-like illnesses (ILI) or with ARI were in-
cluded in this surveillance. The WHO case deﬁnitions
for ILI and ARI have been used to select patients
from whom specimens have been collected. With
strict adherence to the ILI deﬁnition, a number of
adenovirus-positive patients would have been missed
because some of them presented without or with only
low fever. The samples were stored and transported
refrigerated either by mail or by army courier
services within one or two days of collection.
As shown in Figure 1, 24 military garrisons and
border guard detachment units participate in this
surveillance system. After initial screening for adeno-
virus, inﬂuenza virus types A and B, parainﬂuenzavi-
rus types 1, 2, and 3, and for RSV by real-time PCR
[Ronkko et al., 2011], the samples were stored at
70˚C. For the present study, 794 adenovirus-posi-
tive samples collected during the years 2008 through
2012 were available.
Purification of Nucleic Acids and Real-Time PCR
Viral nucleic acids were extracted from 100ml of
original clinical samples using the RNeasy Mini Kit
(Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) following the manufac-
turer’s instructions. Puriﬁed nucleic acids were
eluted in a volume of 50ml.
For primary diagnosis of adenovirus infections,
respiratory samples were tested by a SYBR-Green
PCR [Allard et al., 2001] from 2008 until Novem-
ber 2010. After that, a probe-based real-time PCR
J. Med. Virol. DOI 10.1002/jmv
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[Damen et al., 2008] was used. For identiﬁcation of
the serotype, all samples were tested by the SYBR-
Green assay, amplifying a 301 base pair (bp 21–322)
segment of the adenovirus hexon gene [Allard et al.,
2001] (Table I). The thermal cycling proﬁle consisted
of 15min at 95˚C, followed by 45 or 55 cycles of 15 sec
at 94˚C, 30 sec at 55˚C, and 30 sec at 72˚C, and
the Stratagene Mx3005P PCR platform using
ABsolute Blue QPCR SYBR Green Low ROX Mix
(ThermoScientiﬁc, Epsom, UK).
Cloning
Twelve samples from which direct sequencing of
the amplicon gave inconclusive results were further
analyzed by cloning the amplicon and subsequent
sequencing. Amplicons were cloned using the TOPO
TA cloning kit according to the manufacturer’s in-
structions (Invitrogen Corporation, Carlsbad, CA).
Six colonies from the cloning plate of each of the 12
samples were analyzed.
Sequencing and Genetic Comparison
Amplicons and cloning products were sequenced by
the Finnish Institute for Molecular Medicine (Helsinki,
Finland). Nucleotide sequences were further analyzed
with the Sequencer 5.1 program (Gene Codes Corpo-
ration, Ann Arbor, MI). The BLAST search tool (http://
www.ncbi.nml.nih.gov/BLAST/) and ClustalW (http://
www.ebi.ac.uk/Tools/msa/clustalw2/) were used to com-
pare amplicon sequences to reference sequences pub-
lished in GenBank.
RESULTS
A total of 3,577 respiratory samples were col-
lected during 57 months over a total observation
period of 60 months from 2008 to 2012. The vast
majority of adenovirus-positive individuals were
between 19 and 21 years of age, male, and in the
military rank of conscript. The locations where the
infections were diagnosed are shown in Figure 1.
All samples were analyzed for the presence of
inﬂuenza A and B, parainﬂuenza 1, 2, and 3, RSV
and adenoviruses with real-time PCR [Ronkko
et al., 2011]. Of those, 837 samples (23.4 percent)
were found adenovirus-positive by real-time PCR
(Fig. 2). During the period of observation, the
majority of adenovirus-positive patients presented
with febrile tonsillitis, but in contrast to patients
with a streptococcal pharyngitis, palpable cervical
lymph nodes were smaller. CRP and leukocytes
usually were increased. Adenovirus-positive con-
scripts were excused from active service, typically
for 2–3 days until they were afebrile. Major adeno-
virus epidemics were recorded during late winter
and early spring. This is the period when conscripts
Fig. 1. Adenovirus-positive samples were collected from individuals with acute respiratory
infections in 24 Finnish military garrisons or border guard detachments during the years 2008–
2012. The serotype was determined for 672 specimens either by direct sequencing of a PCR
amplicon or after cloning. For 122 samples the serotype could not be identiﬁed. The annual
percentage of undetermined serotypes varied from 0 to 27.8 percent of all adenovirus positive
samples during these years (Table II).
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are in basic training and participate in ﬁeld exer-
cises. Often these spring outbreaks of adenovirus
are preceded by inﬂuenza outbreaks which often
start within weeks of the new conscripts having
entered service in January (data not shown). Be-
cause of the common inﬂuenza outbreaks, inﬂuenza
vaccine has been offered to all conscripts entering
service since 2012. In the two latter years of this
surveillance, adenovirus epidemics also occurred in
fall. These major outbreaks were caused either by
adenovirus type 3 or type 4, with one of these types
clearly dominating each outbreak (Table II). Adeno-
virus-positive samples were observed in 41 of the
57 months during which respiratory samples were
obtained, with a monthly positivity rate for adeno-
viruses ranging from 0.6 to 69.4 percent. Of these
837 adenovirus-positive samples, 794 (94.9 percent)
were available for identiﬁcation of the serotype
based on genetic analyses. Sequences obtained from
the samples were aligned with those of reference
viruses available from GenBank. The nucleotide
sequences of the amplicon were heterogenous
enough to allow discrimination of subgenera and
serotypes [Allard et al., 2001]. Sequences from the
study samples were 99–100 percent identical to
those from the reference viruses of serotypes 1, 2,
3, or 4, respectively.
Serotypes 4 (487 samples) and 3 (181 samples)
were most prevalent in this material. In addition to
this, one virus of serotype 1, and three of serotype 2
were identiﬁed by direct sequencing of the PCR
amplicon (Table II). Furthermore, the amplicon of 12
real-time PCR low-positive samples with a cyclic
threshold value (Ct) 41 was cloned and the se-
quence was established from multiple colonies. All
these 12 samples were from 2010 and early 2011 and
were of serotype 4.
The serotype of 122 samples could not be deter-
mined by the methods used (Table II). All these
undetermined samples had a negative or a weak
positive result upon retesting by real-time PCR with
Ct 42 in a PCR run of 55 cycles. 65 of these samples
were PCR positive only with 55 cycles, and six of
these undetermined samples remained real-time PCR
negative upon retesting for this study.
The prevalence of the two most common serotypes
3 and 4 varied during the years of observation.
Serotype 3 was dominant during 2010 whereas
serotype 4 was the most common during the years
2008, 2009, 2011, and 2012 (Table II). Genetic differ-
ence between the four serotypes was found to be
signiﬁcant as, the ampliﬁed sequence varied from 4.2
to 22.3 percent as determined by alignment using
Clustal W software.
DISCUSSION
Adenoviruses in army training centers are common
health problems leading to considerable number of
days off service. This study presents ﬁndings on the
molecular characterization of adenoviruses circulat-
ing in Finnish garrisons where conscripts are trained.
Using real-time PCR, sequencing, and cloning techni-
ques, the presence of adenovirus serotypes 1, 2, 3,
and 4 was veriﬁed in 794 samples collected from
military conscripts during 2008–2012. Adenovirus
serotypes 1, 3, and 4 were also detected in members
of Border Guard Detachments over the same period
of observation. In Border Guard Detachments hous-
ing conditions are less crowded than in garrisons.
The serotype of 122 samples (15.4 percent) of the
794 adenovirus PCR-positive samples could not be
determined further with sequencing, possibly due to
very low amount or partial degradation of viral DNA
in the clinical sample. Most of the undetermined
samples were, on initial testing, found to be PCR-
positive with a probe-based real-time PCR, which
yielded lower Ct-values than the SYBR Green assay
i.e., reﬂecting higher assay sensitivity. In the present
study, a SYBR Green-based PCR assay was used, as
a probe assay may interfere in sequencing of the PCR
product.
However, using cloning techniques, for 12 of these
undetermined samples collected in late 2010 and
early 2011 the serotype could be identiﬁed as type 4,
even though serotype 3 was the dominant serotype
during 2010.
Recently, Yliharsila et al., [2012] identiﬁed human
adenovirus serotypes with an array-in-well-hybrid-
ization assay from the Finnish civilian population. In
their study, a total of 231 adenovirus-positive sam-
ples were collected between April 2010 and
April 2011. The age of patients included in the study
ranged from 0 to 67 years, and adenovirus serotypes
were detected in a variety of different specimen types
(ocular, nasopharyngeal aspirate or swab, and other
respiratory specimens (NP), stool or others). Their
study showed that individuals aged 18–67 years were
mostly affected by adenovirus serotypes 3 and 4. This
is in agreement with the results presented here, as
the specimens for the present study were obtained
from conscripts with an average age of 19 years.
TABLE I. Primers of the SYBR Green Real-Time PCR -Assay for the Stratagene PCR Platform
Target gene Primer sequences
Final concentration
(nM) Stratagene
Amplicon length
(bp) Reference
hex1deg 50-GCCSCARTGGKCWTACATGCACATC-30 70 301 Allard, A et al 2001
hex2deg 50-CAGCACSCCICGRATGTCAAA-30
J. Med. Virol. DOI 10.1002/jmv
574 M€ols€a et al.
ARTICLE IV
Yliharsila et al., [2012] also found adenovirus sero-
types 1, 2, 5, and 6, in addition to serotypes 3 and 4
in nasopharyngeal secretions taken from patients of
all age groups. Other adenovirus serotypes (8, 19, 31,
and 37) in their study were detected in clinical
samples from patients with clinical presentations
other than respiratory infection. They also observed
an outbreak of adenovirus serotype 3 during 2010,
which is in agreement with the results of the present
study (Table II).
In addition to adenovirus serotype 4, also adenovi-
rus serotype 3 presented as a major serotype in the
sample material. Adenovirus serotype 3 is one of the
most prevalent serotypes detected globally and has
been described as causing both upper and lower
respiratory tract infections, particularly in young
adults [Lebeck et al., 2009; Kunz and Ottolini, 2010].
In the United States, serotype 3 has been reported as
one of the key causes of acute respiratory disease
among military conscripts [Top, 1975]. Adenovirus
serotype 3 has also been linked to infections other
than those of a respiratory nature, e.g., infections
causing neurological symptoms [de Ory et al.,
2013] and myocarditis [Treacy et al., 2010]. Adenovi-
rus serotype 3 belongs to adenovirus group B,
together with adenovirus serotype 7.
Adenovirus serotype 7 is included in the adenovi-
rus vaccine used in the US Armed Forces, together
with adenovirus serotype 4. The vaccine package
includes two separate tablets, one containing adeno 4
active core and one adeno 7 active core [Hoke and
Snyder, 2013]. However, serotype 7 was not identiﬁed
from the material in the present study. Serotype 7
had been found in epidemics before the re-introduc-
tion of vaccination in October 2011 [Ryan et al.,
2002]. Additionally, serotype 7 has also been identi-
ﬁed as a common pathogen among conscripts in
several locations [Jeon et al., 2007; Yusof et al., 2012;
Yu et al., 2013]. Interestingly, serotype 7 started to
present a signiﬁcant threat in the US Armed Forces
when the spread of serotype 4 was controlled by
vaccination [Hoke and Snyder, 2013]. The new adeno-
virus variant of serotype 14 has been associated with
several outbreaks of acute respiratory disease with
high rates of morbidity both in the US and Europe
[Gray and Chorazy, 2009; Tate et al., 2009; Carr
et al., 2011; Hoke and Snyder, 2013], and inclusion of
this serotype in the vaccine is under consideration. In
2007, an outbreak of serotype 14 occurred among
military conscripts, and 48 percent of the patients
with febrile respiratory infection were shown to be
infected with this serotype. These infections resulted
in many hospitalizations and one death [Tate et al.,
2009]. Serotype 14 was not detected in Finnish
conscripts during this study, or in the Finnish
civilian population in the study carried out by
Yliharsila et al., [2012].
An oral adenovirus vaccine was used for about
25 years before vaccine production was halted. After
the adenovirus vaccination was discontinued,
Fig. 2. From 3577 samples collected during the years 2008–
2012, 837 samples (23.4 percent) were found to be adenovirus-
positive upon initial testing by real-time PCR when the speci-
men was received by the laboratory.
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adenoviral illnesses among US military conscripts
returned to high levels [Russell et al., 2006]. Blasiole
et al., [2004] showed how the prevalence of certain
adenovirus serotypes differed substantially during
the years 1996 to 2002 in US military conscripts.
Prior to the adenovirus vaccine discontinuation,
adenovirus serotypes 4 and 7 made up only 4 percent
each of veriﬁed cases, but when the vaccine was no
longer available in 1999, adenovirus serotype 4
became responsible for 98 percent of adenovirus
morbidity. Kolavic-Gray et al., [2002] presented a
prospective epidemiological investigation of 678
military conscripts, where adenovirus serotypes 3, 4,
and 21 were found to cause acute respiratory
disease. Since the new adenovirus vaccine was
taken into use at military basic training centers in
October 2011, febrile respiratory illness and adenovi-
rus serotype 4 rates have fallen dramatically [Hoke
et al., 2012].
Until now, the Finnish Defence Forces have had
little information on the prevalence of the adenovi-
ruses circulating within Finnish garrisons. By geno-
typing adenoviruses, it was possible to identify which
adenovirus serotypes occur during adenovirus epi-
demics in Finnish military garrisons. Since no adeno-
virus 7 infections were diagnosed during this 5-year
follow-up, Finnish military conscripts might beneﬁt
from adenovirus virus vaccine containing the sero-
type 4, as is used in the US Armed Forces. This
would, however, require continued surveillance to
determine, whether adenovirus 7 or any other sero-
type would replace adenovirus 4 after wide-spread
vaccination of conscripts.
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